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CHINA'S MINI TAIPEI AT ZHURIHE: LONG-TERM MILITARY PREPARATION AND THE SHORT-TERM GAP BETWEEN COERCIVE SIGNALING AND INVASION RISK

  • 4 hours ago
  • 7 min read

Martina Elena Nitti, Cristiana Harless, Kendall McElwee, Martina Guerrero, OSINT-RDT Team

Alessandro Portolano, Editor; Jennifer Loy, Chief Editor

June 21, 2026


 Mini-Taipei Site in Inner Mongolia, China[1]


Key judgments  

China’s development of a large-scale training site resembling key sites in Taipei likely signals continued coercive pressure and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s preparation for potential military operations against Taiwan. Recent satellite imagery reveals the development of a mock site in Inner Mongolia that mimics key sites within  Taiwan’s capital, including government buildings and road networks.[2] The facility provides a training environment for operational planning and exercises associated with open warfare and cross-strait operations. Given Taipei’s central role in Taiwan’s national governance, the training site provides insight into Beijing’s military priorities and planning.[3] This analysis uses Google Earth satellite imagery to identify and assess the training site’s scale, design, and operational significance. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) enables the examination of construction patterns, infrastructure replication, and expansion over time. Combined with verified open-source reporting, GEOINT provides a deeper understanding of China’s military preparedness and evolving capabilities for operations targeting Taiwan.


China’s Mini Taipei Expansion At Zhurihe: Long-Term Military Preparation and the Short-Term Gap Between Coercive Signaling and Invasion Risk

  • Region and focus of the study: This study examines developments at China’s Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia and how the facility supports the PLA’s preparation for potential operations against Taiwan.[4] Developing replicas of key Taiwanese government buildings, transportation networks, and facilities will likely improve China’s training ability, leadership-targeting exercises, and operational planning while reinforcing coercive signaling on Taiwan. Satellite imagery shows that the site has expanded since 2015, with new replicas of government buildings and infrastructure, emphasizing Beijing’s focus on military operations and readiness.[5]

  • Investigative focus: Between 2014 and 2025, imagery analysts observed China constructing a small replica of streets and buildings from Taipei, Taiwan, inside the Zhurihe military base in Mongolia. The replica included key government buildings such as the foreign and defense ministries, the court building, Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan, and Taiwan’s presidential office.[6] In 2022, satellite imagery showed PLA forces erecting roadblocks around important buildings and moving armored vehicles into the area.[7] Soon after, imagery captured PLA forces conducting simulated combat exercises against role-playing defenders of the presidential office, demonstrating active training at the base. This study explores the significance of building and actively using the Zhurihe base as part of China’s strategy to pressure Taiwan and promote a peaceful reunification under “One China.”

  • Affected points:

Site of Constructions for Taipei’s Mock-ups in Inner Mongolia, China, January 17, 2014[8] 


Site of Construction for Taipei’s Mock-ups in Inner Mongolia, China, May 1, 2025[9]


Taiwan's area interested by the Chinese mockups, May 31, 2025[10]


  • Patterns between affected points:

    • Terrain changes: The 2014 terrain is deserted and underdeveloped, showing no signs of any infrastructure present and a deep brown coloring. In the 2025 image, the terrain appears with a lighter brown color compared to the 2014 image. The new constructions and the use of the area for military drills likely further disrupting the terrain, causing the lighter color.

    • Operational changes: While the area was empty in 2014, the erection of “mini-Taipei” indicates its use for military training, likely preparations for an operation against Taiwan’s capital. The Chinese military built structures similar to Taiwan’s Presidential Office building, the National Central Library, and the Judicial Yuan, and around 6km of roads. These structures are the only visible ones for several kilometers, likely signaling the clandestine nature of the activities occurring here. The presence of residue and trash around the area is very likely a sign of consistent use of the base, likely highlighting that this is an active military site, as well as the various holes around the base. The recent development of new structures within the base likely aims to increase operational knowledge and on-site capabilities of Chinese troops in case of on-the-ground activities.


Secondary sources

The construction of mini-Taipei will likely represent preparations for a kinetic conflict in the mid- and long-term, while also maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pressure against Taiwan and preserving future strategic alternatives. Beijing’s offensive posture will very likely push Japan and the Philippines toward regional securitization against potential Chinese threats, likely creating a strategic buffer to directly counter Beijing's influence in the Indo-Pacific. China’s activity at Zhurihe likely signals Beijing preserving strategic options rather than an imminent attack, likely preferring a strategic economic, political, and military blockade to isolate and weaken Taiwan over a costly invasion. An economic blockade on Taiwan will almost certainly disrupt global supply chains, derailing high-tech economies before any direct military confrontation occurs. The blockade will also very likely serve as a concealed escalation, testing Taiwan's allies’ operational support due to lack of a clear attack.


Despite repeated provocative gestures, activities at Zhurihe military base are not necessarily consistent with an imminent military invasion, but rather with attempts at psychological warfare and coercive pressure aimed at weakening Taiwan’s preparedness by constantly applying pressure. The improvement of China’s integration of military, information, cyber, and economic coercion on Taiwan’s government also solidifies this hypothesis.[11] Still, increasing airspace violations and PLA naval exercises near the Taiwan Strait suggest that Beijing’s strategic posture is gradually shifting from psychological pressure to operational readiness.[12] Developments at Zhurihe indicate that China is preparing for a scenario where Taiwan’s leadership has a minimal escape route. Mini-Taipei includes a 280-meter tunnel connecting the Presidential Office to the Judicial Yuan, suggesting that China is both enhancing its military capabilities for a potential takeover of Taiwan's institutions and engaging in escalating coercive signaling.[13] Additionally, satellite imagery from May 2026 reveals military expansion across China, including a network of nuclear launch facilities, bunkers, mock-ups of Western jet fighters, and communications hubs in Xinjiang, likely suggesting a coordinated and multi-domain military buildup that extends far beyond the Taiwan Strait.[14]


Persistent China-Taiwan tensions have pushed regional and global powers to recalibrate their defense postures. The Philippines has openly criticized China’s maritime pressure on Taiwan, while China declared to be defending their sovereignty.[15] Beijing also violated Japan’s exclusive economic zone by crossing the Miyako Strait with four strategic warships, reinforcing the idea of both countries’ self-defense needs.[16] For this reason, Japan and the Philippines have signed a mutual defense logistics agreement in January 2026. Across the Pacific, the US has not formally committed to intervening in the event of a conflict but it openly supports Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities by supplying defensive weapons to the island under the Taiwan Relations Act, despite repeated warnings from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s of mishandling agreements regarding Taiwan.[17] With the aim of exploiting internal political divisions, Beijing has also kept non-military options in play, as evidenced with Taiwan’s opposition party Kuomintang’s (KMT) recent visit to China, which has led to a more reconciling tone.[18] Overall, the fragmentation of alliances in the Indo-Pacific and the lack of defined stances in the case of an irreversible change of balance prevent any clear hypothesis of future scenarios.


The most immediate threat to Taiwan remains an economic and military blockade, allowing Beijing to exert maximum pressure  by disrupting Taiwan’s critical role in the global semiconductor industry and testing the determination of Taipei’s allies without crossing the threshold into a costly open war. Chinese seizure of Taiwan, either through a political or military solution would disrupt global technology production forcing adversaries like the US to negotiate a solution before any direct confrontation occurs. Although the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which accounts for approximately 70 percent of the global market share, made significant efforts to diversify production to facilities in the US, Japan, and Germany, the most advanced nodes remain in Taiwan.[19]  While this diversification will gradually reduce global dependence on the island, it also creates a window of opportunity, rendering a Chinese invasion attractive to secure leverage over its adversaries before the shift in semiconductor production from Taiwan is complete.[20] 


Conclusion 

Since 2020, China has built a small replica of key sites in Taipei at the Zhurihe military base in Inner Mongolia and has run mock operations simulating attacks on its key buildings, including the Presidential Office. The PLA uses the area for military training to prepare for a potential invasion, as evidenced by operational changes at the base. Satellite imagery and secondary sources confirmed sustained and ongoing military activity at the site, including the development of additional buildings. The study focuses on long-term preparation to strengthen the PLA’s military capabilities, as China continues to pressure Taiwan toward peaceful reunification or prepares for a possible forceful invasion under the “One China” policy. While the US has not directly said it will step in on behalf of Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act continues to define the relationship between the US and Taiwan, which provides Taiwan with defensive support in the case of China's invasion.


[1] 39.29515,105.49986 via Google Earth

[2] China builds expansive ‘mini-Taipei’ to train troops for Taiwan strike scenarios, Interesting Engineering, https://interestingengineering.com/military/china-builds-expansive-mini-taipei 

[3] China expands ‘mock Taipei’ site in Inner Mongolia: report, Taipei Times, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/10/02/2003844809

[4] Ibid

[5] China builds expansive ‘mini-Taipei’ to train troops for Taiwan strike scenarios, Interesting Engineering, https://interestingengineering.com/military/china-builds-expansive-mini-taipei 

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8]39.29515,105.49986 via Google Earth

[9] 39.29515,105.49986 via Google Earth

[11] PRC COERCIVE INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF TAIWAN’S RESILIENCE, February 2026, U.S. House of Representatives, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ZS/ZS00/20260211/118956/HHRG-119-ZS00-Wstate-Rapp-HooperM-20260211.pdf 

[12] Ibid

[13] PLA adds to 'mock Taipei' for decapitation strike drills, October 2025, Taiwan News, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6212448

[14] China is building launch pads near its nuclear missile silos, June 2026, Defense News https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2026/05/29/china-is-building-launch-pads-near-its-nuclear-missile-silos/

[15] China in the Indo-Pacific: January 2026, Council of Foreign Relations, April 2026,  https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-in-the-indo-pacific-january-2026

[16] Ibid

[17] Taiwan Explained: Why China Claims It, and Why the U.S. Is Involved, March 2026, Council of Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump

[18] What the Taiwanese opposition leader’s recent China visit means for Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, April 2026. Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-the-taiwanese-opposition-leaders-recent-china-visit-means-for-taipei-beijing-and-washington/

[19] Taiwan says 40% shift of chip capacity to US is 'impossible', Reuters, February 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-40-shift-chip-capacity-us-is-impossible-2026-02-09/

[20] Investors diversify from TSMC to other winners of AI boom, Taipei Times, May 2026, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2026/05/23/2003857807

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