MYANMAR’S JUNTA WITHDRAWS FROM A PIPELINE OFF-STATION, POLICE INVESTIGATE THE KILLING OF A DOCTOR FROM THE AHMADI MINORITY IN PAKISTAN, AND 38 CHINESE NATIONALS REACH TAIWANESE COASTS ON SMALL BOATS

May 15-21, 2025 | Issue 18 - PACOM and CENTCOM teams

Amelia Bell, Sue Friend, Isabelle Hilyer-Jones, Laura Fuchs, Meghan Terry, Jigyasa Maloo, Nicholas Novak

Archie Archie, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

Gas Facility[1]

Date: May 16, 2025

Location: Mandalay Region, Myanmar

Parties involved: Burmese military junta; Myanmar; anti-junta resistance groups; resistance group People's Defense Forces (PDF) and Zero Guerrilla Force; China; importing and exporting conglomerate Japan’s Marubeni Corporation; foreign investors; international stakeholders

The event: Myanmar’s junta withdraws from a Chinese pipeline off-take station following coordinated resistance assaults.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

• The junta’s off-take station abandonment will very likely signal its inability to protect critical infrastructure, such as gas pipelines and ports, very likely undermining its legitimacy and authority with foreign investors. This perceived vulnerability will very likely erode international stakeholders’ confidence in the regime’s capacity to safeguard infrastructure development investments, making Myanmar a less attractive destination for foreign capital and technical expertise. Major stakeholders, such as Japan’s Marubeni Corporation, will likely withdraw from high-risk projects, including those in natural resource extraction and energy, likely accelerating the junta’s economic isolation and depriving it of essential revenue streams. International stakeholders who remain engaged will very likely embed security consultants, reroute supply chains, or seek joint protection agreements with local actors, likely empowering non-state armed resistance groups, and fragmenting the power dynamics around Myanmar’s most valuable infrastructure assets.  

• Resistance groups in the Mandalay Region, including Zero Guerrilla Force, will very likely feel emboldened by the perceived vulnerability of junta positions, forming stronger operational alliances via sharing intelligence, pooling resources, and synchronizing tactics to launch coordinated multi-front attacks against strategic sites. These alliances will very likely enable resistance groups to exploit the junta’s static defensive positions and slow-moving reinforcements, allowing for targeted strikes on command structures and key isolated military outposts such as  Natogyi, Taung Tha, Myingyan, and Ngazun. As these joint operations succeed, resistance groups will very likely shift their focus from military outposts to sabotaging higher-value infrastructure such as transportation corridors, pipeline nodes, and energy terminals, likely undermining the junta’s ability to project power internationally. The alliance's intensification of joint resistance operations and territorial gain will very likely open new fronts beyond Mandalay and threaten international trade routes and Chinese-backed infrastructure.

Date: May 19, 2025

Location: Sargodha, Punjab Province, Pakistan

Parties involved: Pakistan; Sargodha local authorities; Sargodha police; institutions; law-enforcement; anti-Ahmadi Islamist extremist groups Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); Ahmadi physician; Ahmadi community; Ahmadi protection groups; witnesses; non-Ahmadi civilians; perpetrator; attackers The event: An investigation has been launched to find the murderer of an Ahmadi physician, the third targeted killing of an Ahmadi in two months.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

• Societal anti-Ahmadi sentiments and Islamist extremist interference will very likely hamper the police investigation, likely increasing extremist influence over Sargodha institutions. The police will very likely face obstacles in obtaining witness interviews and accessing evidence due to the Ahmadis’ distrust of law enforcement. Anti-Ahmadi groups like TLP and TTP will likely attempt to disrupt the investigation to prevent justice for Ahmadis by threatening the police, intimidating witnesses, and endangering Ahmadi property. Extremist interference and limited investigative tools will very likely incapacitate the police, likely leading some officers to comply with extremist groups and inadvertently strengthening their leverage over Sargodha’s authorities and institutions.

• The Ahmadi community will very likely consider authorities unable to ensure their safety, very likely establishing Ahmadi protection groups. Unsatisfactory outcomes, like the inability to find the perpetrator, will almost certainly make the Ahmadi community feel less secure in Sargodha and the wider Punjab Province in Pakistan, fearing TLP and TTP attacks, especially in the run-up to Ahmadi festivities, such as Eid-al-Adha. Ahmadi protection groups will likely increase their presence and activity as a show of force to discourage potential attackers, but will likely strain Ahmadi relationships with local authorities and non-Ahmadi citizens feeling threatened by these military units. Ahmadi protection groups will very likely enrage anti-Ahmadi forces like TLP and TTP, putting Ahmadis at risk during upcoming religious festivities, and likely reinforcing the cycle of violence in the Sargodha region.

Date: May 20, 2025

Location: Taiwan

Parties involved: President of Taiwan Lai Ching-te administration; Taiwan; Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA); Taiwanese law enforcement agencies; China; People’s Liberation Army (PLA); Chinese nationals; Chinese threat actors’ operatives

The event: Using small boats, 38 Chinese nationals landed in Taiwan .[4]

Analysis & Implications:

• China will very likely increase pressure on Taiwan by exploiting irregular maritime landings to test the CGA’s detection and response capacity. PLA will likely monitor CGA detection methods and reaction times to identify geographic gaps in Taiwan's defensive lines, likely enabling more deliberate and sustained incursions over time. Persistent incursions on offshore archipelagos near the Chinese mainland will likely compel the CGA to broaden its area of operation, very likely increasing response times and creating exploitable gaps along the Taiwanese coastline. China will almost certainly use the intelligence gained from these operations to refine its maritime infiltration doctrine, likely improving the PLA’s ability to execute rapid landings if hostilities were to arise.

• Taiwan will very likely counter infiltration risks through strengthened border security measures, likely increasing scrutiny of Chinese nationals attempting to reside in Taiwan. The Lai administration will almost certainly implement stricter legal entry measures, such as residency permit denial, visa revocation, and background checks, to identify possible threat actors’ operatives, very likely as part of a national security strategy focused on infiltration and espionage. Taiwan’s law enforcement agencies will very likely closely monitor the digital footprint of Chinese nationals residing in Taiwan, likely focusing on individuals expressing pro-Chinese stances or critical of the Lai administration. The Taiwanese authorities will very likely increase deportations of suspected residents, likely dividing public opinion and increasing the risk of a polarized political discourse.

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[1] Gas Management, generated by a third party database

[2] Myanmar Junta Abandons Chinese Pipeline Amid Resistance Attacks, The Irrawaddy, May 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-abandons-chinese-pipeline-amid-resistance-attacks.html 

[3] Pakistani police search for the suspect in the killing of an Ahmadi minority doctor, AP, May 2025, https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-police-ahmadi-killing-3dfd2ca46eec5e51f007f6fcdf3555a7 

[4] Chinese small boats landings on Taiwan are a new source of concern, ABC News, May 2025, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/forget-chinas-navy-chinese-small-boats-landings-taiwan-121977574