THREAT CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: ELN EXPANDED THE NUMBER OF CLANDESTINE AIRSTRIPS AND LOGISTICAL CAMPS ALONG VENEZUELAN BORDER STATES, LIKELY INCREASING ITS TERRITORIAL FOOTPRINT AND ROLE WITHIN COMMUNITIES
Laura Ospina, Maya Kerr Coste, Vanessa Neubauer, Sarah Granados, Troy Scott Jr., Dominic Perfetti, Matthew George, Aristide Devevey, Sharon Preci
Olivia Turnbull, Embedded Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
October 12, 2026
Remote Road[1]
BLUF
The National Liberation Army (ELN) has expanded its logistical and operational network of airstrips and camps in Venezuela, increasing its territorial control in support of illicit operations.[2] The ELN’s activities and infrastructure were confined to the Colombia-Venezuela border region, limited by its geographic footprint and ideological focus on guerrilla-linked goals in Colombia.[3] ELN activity in Venezuela will very likely escalate toward a dispersed operational presence, likely expanding its infrastructure and territorial influence beyond bordering states. The establishment of infrastructure, including clandestine airstrips, camps, and corridors, exceeding border states will very likely enable the ELN to reinforce its binational network, likely enhancing its socioeconomic foothold in Venezuela. The leveraging of socioeconomic ties will very likely increase citizens' involvement in the ELN’s operations, likely driving local workforce recruitment to fuel illicit narcotics and mining operations. Increasing community and government tolerance will very likely grant ELN greater influence in political affairs, likely entrenching its illicit objectives into the political and economic frameworks of Venezuela with minimal intervention. The ELN’s multi-layered influence in strategically located Venezuelan regions will very likely allow the group to circumvent government and military forces, likely establishing itself as a parallel governing authority while expanding territorial reach.
Introduction
On October 1, 2026, Colombian Intelligence identified at least 93 clandestine airstrips, 15 of which have been surveilled since the beginning of the year, and changes in the location of National Liberation Army (ELN) camps in Venezuela.[4] Colombian intelligence has monitored ELN movements, transportation infrastructure, and cross-border activity in the Venezuelan border states of Zulia and Táchira.[5] The ELN originated as a Marxist-Leninist group, initially excluding drug trafficking from its ideological principles until the prospect of easy profits outweighed its original beliefs.[6] ELN initially used remote areas near the Venezuelan border to evade Colombian authorities, but over time expanded beyond refuge into broader operations.[7] In the late 1990s, the ELN capitalized on its relationship with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez to help him maintain power and serve as a security force while gaining access to military training and funding.[8] The ELN moved beyond taxing coca production to operating cocaine laboratories, overseeing cross-border transportation, and recruiting Venezuelan residents into coca production.[9] Under Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, ELN strengthened its ties with military officials and political actors, including support for illegal mining operations and coordination over territorial control.[10] Through the corruption network of the Cartel of the Suns, ELN members have reportedly paid Venezuelan officials and military personnel to move shipments through checkpoints and monitored airspace.[11] ELN has exercised social control in Venezuelan border communities by distributing food, participating in local activities, and infiltrating community life.[12] Hundreds of illegal crossings in Colombia serve as clandestine corridors for the movement of drugs, weapons, and people across the border.[13] The ELN’s shift from primarily operating in Colombia enabled illicit economic networks and relationships with Venezuelan military and political officials, facilitating the expansion of operational and logistical infrastructure beyond its original refuge areas.[14]
Analysis
Socio-economic
The ELN will very likely shift from a Colombian guerrilla movement to a socioeconomically integrated actor in Venezuela, likely using its economic leverage over poor local regions to assert social governance. The ELN originated as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement whose activities revolved around ideological and political objectives. The group’s initial ideological incompatibility with drug trafficking shaped interactions with local populations to focus on extracting resources and supporting its cross-border operations, including taxing farmers and paying villagers to staff illegal operations. The ideological stance against narcotics gradually weakened, very likely due to the economic opportunities they provided. The financial incentives will likely serve as a significant source of revenue to fund the group's expansion. ELN operations will likely become strategically integrated with local Venezuelan communities as the group expands recruitment and socio‑economic control. Community integration within the ELN ecosystem will likely solidify ELN’s role in cocaine production, cross‑border transportation, and local resource control, very likely supporting its transition toward binational strategic operations. A tighter system of socio‑economic control will very likely entrench ELN criminal infrastructure and sustain recruitment to establish de facto social and economic governance over border‑zone regions in Venezuela. By developing socio-economic control of local populations, the ELN will very likely exploit a weak state presence and limited investment in public institutions. The ELN will very likely incorporate a tactical shift in its drug trafficking to prioritize regional investment, such as in the local educational system. The ELN’s influence in social programs will likely entice some local communities to tolerate the ELN's engagement in violence and drug trafficking. The chances to view the ELN's regionally positive tactics favourably will likely prompt recruitment, particularly among economically vulnerable youth populations. A revolving socio-economic ecosystem between the ELN and youth populations will very likely entrench the ELN and likely provide the organization with a platform to develop its cross-border drug trafficking strategy.
Political
The association between the ELN and the Venezuelan government will likely shift from a permissive relationship with limited political ties to closer cooperation with political officials. The ELN operated in Colombian territory until the organization established Venezuela’s Apure region as a location to avoid Colombian security forces. The ELN’s violent attacks on the Carabobo naval base and the Cotufi region created an adversarial relationship with the Venezuelan government and generated public disapproval. The Chavez administration tolerated the group’s operations on a limited scale to maintain political power. This enabled the ELN to conduct illicit activities without exercising significant political influence, while receiving funding, weapons, and training from the government. The relationship very likely evolved into an alliance, transforming the ELN into a paramilitary arm that supported the Maduro administration, very likely aiding in voter suppression, bribery, and coercion. Political ties cultivated through the Maduro administration will very likely grant the ELN an enduring avenue for political integration through the Cartel of the Suns' bribe network with government officials, likely allowing them to sustain their strategy of exchanging political advocacy and payments for territorial control. This will likely provide the ELN with sufficient political protection to facilitate binational illicit operations, likely increasing their drug production and logistical networks along Venezuelan border states, including Zulia and Táchira. The ELN’s ability to build strong political ties with Venezuelan government officials will very likely provide a strategic advantage in interfering in state affairs, likely fostering greater political tolerance that advances their activities. The government’s receptiveness will likely expand opportunities for the ELN to recruit locals for mining and trafficking activities, likely reinforcing the ELN’s political influence in vulnerable communities. Greater political integration with government authorities in communities along the border will likely create an alternative support network for Venezuelan citizens seeking security and resources, likely exploiting existing limitations in state and federal government legitimacy to present itself as an alternative governing actor. The erosion of Venezuelan federal and state authority will likely frame some public perceptions in favor of broader ELN political leadership, likely encouraging the armed group to use political coercive practices, including incentivization, voter intimidation, and extortion, that support its cross-border illicit operations.
Geographic
ELN territorial presence in Venezuela will likely expand from concentration in remote areas used primarily for refuge to greater geographic dispersion across populated and strategically significant areas. ELN historically relied on Venezuelan territory as an operational refuge to evade and reduce surveillance from Colombian security forces. The exposure to Venezuelan territory provided ELN with a scheme for the establishment of future drug production routes and additional facilities. The group concentrated its local operational presence in remote areas that provided cover and access to the international border. ELN has likely continued exploiting border vulnerabilities through established agreements with the National Bolivarian Armed Forces under Maduro to permit ELN control and extraction in Bolívar state in exchange for mining profits. The ELN will likely maintain an increasingly geographically dispersed presence as relationships with Venezuela’s military actors reduce constraints on the group’s movement and operations. Networks of corruption and accommodation involving military personnel will likely facilitate passage through checkpoints, access to strategic territory, and the use of clandestine transportation routes. Weak border and airspace enforcement will likely allow the group to exploit poorly monitored crossings, remote territory, and clandestine air routes to sustain activity in more locations. Access to multiple poorly monitored areas and routes will likely allow the group flexibility to shift personnel, resources, and illicit activity between multiple locations when certain routes or areas become less accessible. The ELN’s ability to operate across multiple jurisdictions will likely complicate security operations, likely facilitating cross-border logistical networks despite localized enforcement efforts. The pressure from Colombian military forces will unlikely mitigate persistent geographic dispersion of drug production, likely resulting in security gaps that the ELN can exploit to facilitate cross-border movement of illicit activity. Exploitation of security response vulnerabilities will likely force Colombian and Venezuelan authorities to monitor an increased level of dispersed activities in ELN operating areas, likely complicating efforts to balance enforcement priorities across multiple border corridors and airstrips.
Threat Climate Assessment
Analysis indicates that there is a HIGH PROBABILITY that the threat climate shifts from a limited ELN geographical presence along the Colombia-Venezuela border to an increase in illicit operational networks and infrastructure, enabling the ELN to strengthen their influence within social and political systems across Venezuela. The ELN’s established socioeconomic influence will VERY LIKELY support an expansion in the recruitment of local residents, participation in drug production and smuggling, and control of illicit tax and mining activity, LIKELY providing the labor and resources necessary to sustain additional operations. Increased operations supported by an evolving relationship with Venezuelan government officials will VERY LIKELY provide the ELN opportunities to gain legitimacy and establish sustainable channels like the Cartel of the Suns, LIKELY facilitating the exchange of political and monetary benefits for territorial control. The ELN’s political cover will VERY LIKELY minimize external intervention, LIKELY enabling the group to conduct its binational illicit operations. These conditions will VERY LIKELY support the ELN’s geographic expansion from remote border areas into populated communities and a more dispersed network of camps and corridors. The ELN’s existing influence within local communities and government structures will VERY LIKELY allow accommodations by military actors, LIKELY reducing barriers to movement and territorial access. The entrenchment of the ELN with local authorities will VERY LIKELY allow the group to interfere in local government affairs and military efforts, LIKELY enabling the ELN to expand its geographic control beyond border states while complicating efforts to disrupt its operations.
[1] Yuma Proving Ground and Arctic Regions Command Groups visit Tropic Regions [Image 3 of 4] by Ana Henderson, licensed under Public Domain, (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD/DoW endorsement) (This image pixelation has been enhanced by a third party)
[2] ELN in Venezuela: 93 clandestine airstrips identified and changes in their camps, Infobae, October 2026, https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2026/10/01/eln-en-venezuela-identifican-93-pistas-clandestinas-y-cambios-en-sus-campamentos/ (Translated by Google)
[3] Cocaine Corridor: Drugs Drive ELN’s Venezuela Expansion, Insight Crime, December 2025, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/cocaine-corridor-drugs-drive-eln-venezuela-expansion/
[4] ELN in Venezuela: 93 clandestine airstrips identified and changes in their camps, Infobae, October 2026, https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2026/10/01/eln-en-venezuela-identifican-93-pistas-clandestinas-y-cambios-en-sus-campamentos/ (Translated by Google)
[5] Ibid
[6] Cocaine Corridor: Drugs Drive ELN’s Venezuela Expansion, Insight Crime, December 2025, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/cocaine-corridor-drugs-drive-elnaccessof -venezuela-expansion/
[7] ELN in Venezuela: 93 clandestine airstrips identified and changes in their camps, Infobae, October 2026, https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2026/10/01/eln-en-venezuela-identifican-93-pistas-clandestinas-y-cambios-en-sus-campamentos/ (Translated by Google)
[8] How Criminal Groups Helped Fill Venezuela’s Post-Chavez Void, Insight Crime, July 2023,
[9] Cocaine Corridor: Drugs Drive ELN’s Venezuela Expansion, Insight Crime, December 2025, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/cocaine-corridor-drugs-drive-elnaccessof -venezuela-expansion/
[10] The Criminal Portfolio Sustaining Military Loyalty in Venezuela, Insight Crime, February 2026, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/criminal-portfolio-sustaining-military-loyalty-venezuela/
[11] Cocaine Corridor: Drugs Drive ELN’s Venezuela Expansion, Insight Crime, December 2025, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/cocaine-corridor-drugs-drive-eln-venezuela-expansion/
[12] ELN in Venezuela, Insight Crime, January 2026, https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/eln-in-venezuela/
[13] Venezuela 2024: Elections and Criminal Consolidation, Insight Crime, January 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/venezuela-2024-elections-and-criminal-consolidation/
[14] Anti-Mining ‘Crackdown’ Shifts Ops Elsewhere in Venezuela, Insight Crime, July 2025, https://insightcrime.org/news/anti-mining-crackdown-shifts-ops-elsewhere-in-venezuela/
