UKRAINE ESTABLISHES NEW MILITARY BRANCH TO DEFEND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM RUSSIAN AERIAL ATTACKS AND AUSTRALIA FAST-TRACKS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE SHIPYARD UNDER AUKUS PACT
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Updated: 13 hours ago
February 12-18, 2026 | Issue 7 - Emergency Management, Health, and Hazards (EMH2) Team
Chiara Michieli, Nirmal Jose, Nimaya Premachandra, Marija Lazic
Clémence Van Damme, Senior Editor
Air Defense System Launch[1]
Date: February 12, 2026
Location: Ukraine
Parties involved: Ukraine; Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi; new Armed Forces branch air defense brigades; personnel; experienced soldiers; recruits; civilians; key critical infrastructure sites; contested border areas; Russia; Russian military
The event: Syrskyi announced the creation of a new branch of the military dedicated to the protection of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from Russia’s aerial attacks.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
The creation of the new branch will likely result in logistical and organizational problems, with a roughly even chance of lower air defense effectiveness during the initial implementation period. Factors such as the integration of additional personnel to address manpower shortages in air defense brigades will likely exacerbate existing training gaps and interoperability issues, with recruits very likely requiring an adjustment period before operating complex equipment in the field. This reorganization will very likely involve the introduction of new operational protocols and the gradual introduction of new air defense systems, likely slowing down the learning curve even among experienced soldiers. This dynamic will very likely result in the immediate overreliance on low-cost, low-training air defense capabilities, such as the STING interceptor drones, likely limiting protection against precision offensive systems in the short run.
The creation of the new branch will very unlikely secure the entire protection of Ukraine’s railway infrastructure, very likely facilitating continued Russian aerial attacks attempting to disrupt the supply chain of military and civilians. The branch protection will very likely remain limited to key critical infrastructure sites due to its early implementation phase, likely leaving the vast network of rural railway infrastructure less protected against Russian attacks. The Russian military will likely concentrate its attack strategies on these unprotected railways, very likely exploiting the current limitations on the newly formed branch by using drones and surface-to-surface missiles to conduct attacks outside of key critical infrastructure sites. This vulnerability of railway infrastructure will very likely disrupt the logistic chain of civilian and military transportation, likely slowing down the critical supply and reinforcement to the contested border areas.
Date: February 15, 2026
Location: Australia
Parties involved: Australia; Trilateral Security Partnership between Australia, UK, and US (AUKUS); Australia’s defense industrial base; newly-constructed nuclear submarine shipyard; subcontractors; construction facilities; USA; US suppliers; UK; UK suppliers; China; government; Chinese-affiliated threat actors; recruited agents; specialized workers
The event: Australia announced plans to advance construction of a nuclear submarine shipyard in accordance with the AUKUS defence pact.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
Australia’s advancement of the submarine shipyard will likely create production vulnerabilities due to reliance on US and UK suppliers for critical submarine technologies, very likely embedding external influence into the pacing of domestic production decisions. Australia will very likely experience shipment variability in US and UK deliveries of nuclear propulsion systems and submarine systems integration due to their integration within broader allied naval industrial programs, likely positioning Australian procurement within a shared allocation hierarchy. Variability in component deliveries will very likely extend production timelines and alter domestic industrial expansion by reducing predictability for subcontractors, training pipelines, and infrastructure investment, likely slowing consolidation of a stable submarine manufacturing base. The incomplete consolidation of the manufacturing base will very likely shape Australia’s long-term role within the AUKUS industrial framework, likely reinforcing structural dependence without enabling full integration of an independent nuclear submarine production.
The shipyard’s role in AUKUS will likely make its construction and technology transfer a prime target for foreign espionage by Chinese-affiliated threat actors, raising insider threat risks across Australia’s defense industrial base. The significance of the shipyard to trilateral cooperation will likely prompt Chinese-affiliated threat actors to engage in cyber espionage and attempt to infiltrate construction facilities through recruited agents as specialized workers in construction facilities. Threat actors will likely use such espionage techniques to access propulsion data and construction timelines to gauge AUKUS operational readiness and identify strategic vulnerabilities in submarine’s acoustic signature management systems, improving China’s anti-submarine warfare planning. Such insider access would likely diminish the strategic advantage of AUKUS submarines by enabling the Chinese government to refine counter-submarine capabilities prior to their operational deployment.
[1] ADA Supports Dynamic Front 26, by Maj. Alexander Watkins, licensed under Public Domain (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD/DoW endorsement.)
[2] Ukraine creates new military branch to shield critical infrastructure from Russian air strikes, Euromaidan Press, February 2026,
[3] Australia pledges $2.7 billion to progress nuclear submarine shipyard build, Reuters, February 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-pledges-27-billion-progress-nuclear-submarine-shipyard-build-2026-02-15/
