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BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT OF MAINE SHOOTER'S ATTACK, INTELLIGENCE GAPS, AND LESSONS LEARNED

Megan Khalife, Gabriel Helupka Behavior/Leadership Team

Jennifer Loy, Chief Editor

November 8, 2023


Robert Card[1]



Name of Person POI: Robert R. Card

Date of Death: October 27, 2023


Summary

On October 25, 2023, US Army reservist Robert Card (POI) opened fire on civilians at the Just in Time bowling alley and the Schemengees Bar and Grille. Reports at this time indicate POI killed 18 civilians and injured 13 others. POI fled the attack scenes in Lewiston, leading to a two-day manhunt that extended into wooded areas in Lisbon, approximately 7.8 miles from Lewiston. Law enforcement found the POI deceased near the Maine Recycling overflow area in Lisbon at 1945 local time on October 27.[2] Authorities reported POI believed that the bar manager had once called him "gay" and that a recent breakup seemed to trigger a decline in his mental state, prompting him to exhibit concerning behavior, including paranoia and delusions. POI’s paranoia centered around a conspiracy of people accusing him of being a pedophile, and he was convinced that his family members were involved in the conspiracy.[3] At the time of this report, there is enough information to suggest POI’s attack was motivated by a personal grievance. Due to the prevalence of proximal warning behaviors, distal characteristics, and the communal and national impact, The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) considers it appropriate to classify POI’s attack as a lone-actor, isolated domestic incident. Local law enforcement likely either undervalued or misinterpreted key indicators and warnings (I&Ws) available about POI’s mental health state. Policymakers should address challenges related to striking a balance between respecting civil liberties and ensuring public safety when dealing with cases of mental health concerns.


Attack Type: Mass shooting


Date/Time: October 25, 2023/1856 local time


Weapons/Means: AR-10 style Ruger SFAR, Smith & Wesson M&P .40 caliber handgun, and a Smith & Wesson M&P AR-15 rifle[4]


Target and Goal

Based on available evidence, POI’s goal was likely to enact revenge on businesses he believed were spreading rumors about him being a pedophile.[5]


Motive

POI was very likely motivated to act on the above goal based on family members and fellow reserve soldiers invalidating his paranoia about hearing voices related to allegations surrounding his sexual preferences.


Lewiston Police Photo of POI Using an AR[6]


Location: Lewiston, Androscoggin County, Maine, USA[7]


Intended Target: Just in Time bowling alley and the Schemengees Bar and Grille[8]


Number Killed: 18[9]


Number Injured: 13[10]


Timeline of Attack and Manhunt:


October 25, 2023:

  • 1856 local time: Authorities start receiving reports of an active shooter at the Just in Time bowling alley.

  • 1908 local time: Authorities receive reports of an active shooter at the Schemengees Bar and Grille.

  • 2011 local time: Authorities receive reports of an active shooter at the Lewiston Walmart Distribution Center, later determined to be false.

  • 2120 local time: POI is identified as the suspected shooter and provides information on POI’s vehicle.

  • 2201 local time: Law enforcement tactical teams respond to POI’s residence in Bowdin and establish a perimeter.

  • 2208 local time: Law enforcement receives information that POI’s vehicle is located at the Lisbon boat launch site near Frost Hill Road.

  • 2237 local time: Law enforcement tactical teams discover POI’s abandoned car, finding a rifle and magazines.[11]


October 26, 2023:

  • 0001 local time: Law enforcement began notifying victims’ families.

  • 0010 local time: Law enforcement receives Information stating POI’s phone may be at his residence in Bowdoin.[12]

October 27, 2023:

  • 0245 local time: Law enforcement tactical teams conduct surveillance of a Lisbon gravel pit believed to be a location POI is hiding in. It was determined to be a false lead. Law enforcement also investigated a tip that POI was hiding in a Lewiston apartment, deemed unfounded after investigation.

  • 0640 local time: A suspicious male was reported walking on Ferry Rd in Lisbon.

  • 0800 local time: Law enforcement responded to false reports of gunshots across Lisbon, specifically at Golden Rod Lane, Left Hand Club, and Spring Works.

  • 1219 local time: The residence of POI’s mother sent a 911 hang-up call, leading to tactical team deployments and determined to be unfounded.

  • 1945 local time: Law enforcement tactical teams searching the Maine Recycling overflow discover a body they believe to be the POI.

  • 1948 local time: Investigators begin working to positively ID POI.

  • 2010 local time: Approval is given for public dissemination of positive identification of POI’s deceased body.

  • 2210 local time: POI’s family and families of victims are notified of the discovery.[13]


Security Response Time: Around one minute and 30 seconds after the initial call from Just in Time bowling alley.[14]


Maine State Police (MSP)

  • October 25: At 1915 local time, 59 minutes after the first call came in, MSP coordinated responses of all Major Crimes Unit Detectives. At 1920 local time, the MSP Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) deployed to Lewiston.

  • October 26: At 0600 local time, IMAT creates a plan for resources, physical assets, and logistics throughout the investigation’s duration.[15]

New England State Police Administrators Compact (NESPAC)

  • October 25: At 1930 local time, NESPAC deemed the incident of a significant magnitude and ordered tactical, aerial, investigative, and dive team resources on standby to be utilized as needed.[16]

Maine Information and Analysis Center (MIAC)

  • October 25: At 2007 local time, five MIAC analysts were called in for intelligence and information gathering.

  • October 26: MIAC Criminal Intelligence Analysts are assigned to assist detectives and investigators with research, tips, and leads.[17]

Tactics of Incident Management:

  • The Maine State Police IMAT used the Incident Command System (ICS) as a model to coordinate the large-scale operation, allowing for the organization of a manhunt and investigation with different section chiefs.[18]

  • A Command Post was set up at Lewiston High School to facilitate communications between the agencies involved.

  • IMAT deployed resources and personnel from various law enforcement agencies to support operational needs ranging from evidence collection, victims services, and tactical deployment teams.

  • IMAT created intelligence bulletins for local, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to ensure a unified response.

  • The specialized units conducted searches of specific areas, secured locations, and investigated leads.

  • IMAT managed logistics, including the acquisition of food, lodging, and supplies for responding public safety agencies and individual officers. They also coordinated resources for tasks like aerial surveillance and mapping.

  • IMAT organized press conferences for the release of public information to the media, aiming to maintain transparent communication.

  • IMAT used a rolling log to document critical information and task completion and to track the efficiency of the tactical response.[19]

Tactics of the Attack:

  • POI’s rifle used an extended magazine capable and a scope.[20] Former FBI Agent Brad Garrett suggested some extended magazines can shoot roughly 25-30 rounds.[21]

  • Surveillance photographs of POI very likely indicate he was carrying additional magazines in his pockets.

  • POI very likely indiscriminately targeted civilians at Just in Time bowling alley and the Schemengees Bar and Grille.

  • POI not attempting to conceal his identity likely suggests public identification did not deter him.

  • POI was able to escape from Lewiston and enable a subsequent two-day manhunt that extended to wooded areas in Lisbon, roughly 7.8 miles away from Lewiston.[22] POI likely utilized basic survival training and terrain tactics learned in the US Army.

POI Overview - Items of Interest

Below are some items of interest that will identify observable indicators and characteristics to determine if there was a chance to prevent this attack.

  1. POI was a Sergeant First Class in the US Army Reserves. POI enlisted in December 2002 and was assigned to the 304th Infantry Regiment in Saco, Maine[23] as a petroleum supply specialist.[24]

  2. POI attended the University of Maine as an engineering student from 2001 to 2004. He reportedly did not graduate.[25]

  3. POI graduated from Mt. Ararat High School in 2001.[26]

  4. POI worked as a driver for the Maine Recycling Corporation for almost a year in Lisbon.[27]

  5. POI and his ex-wife, who he has a son from, divorced in 2007.[28] POI’s ex-wife and son went to the Topsham School Resource Office with concerns about POI’s mental state.

  6. POI’s sister identified him to Lewiston police after the shooting.[29]

  7. POI’s brother told police that after he ended his relationship with an ex-girlfriend POI started wearing hearing aids and saying “crazy things.”[30]


Observable Indicators and Characteristics

Below are some items of interest that will identify observable indicators and characteristics to determine if there was a chance to prevent this attack.


To indicate whether POI posed a threat, CTG has assessed POI using the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), a structured professional judgment instrument for those engaged in risk assessment of persons of concern for terrorism acts. The TRAP-18 consists of eight proximal warning behaviors and 10 distal characteristics displayed throughout past terrorist attacks (for more information about the scientific method, validity, current usage of the TRAP-18, and definitions of behaviors and characteristics, see the provided source).[31]


Note: View Observable Indicators and Characteristics by downloading the full report located at the bottom of this report.


Classification as Terrorism

According to TRAP-18 creators, most lone actors displayed 13 of 18 TRAP-18 variables (72%). These individuals showed a frequency of >70% on five distal factors: personal grievance and moral outrage, framed by an ideology, dependence on the virtual community, thwarting of occupational goals, and changes in thinking and emotion. They also displayed >77% on the following proximal warning behaviors: pathway, fixation, identification, and leakage. Lone-actor terrorists have shown a pattern of common pre-attack behaviors, discerning them from general criminals


Based on a CTG investigation, POI displayed 14 of the total indicators aligning with other lone-actor terrorists. POI displayed eight out of 10 distal factors, coinciding with those that terrorist lone actors show a frequency of >70% on: personal grievance and moral outrage, framed by an ideology, dependence on the virtual community, thwarting of occupational goals, changes in thinking and emotion, mental disorder, failure of sexual-intimate pair bonding, and criminal violence. POI also displayed eight out of eight warning behaviors: pathway, fixation, identification, energy burst, novel aggression, leakage, last resort, and directly communicated threat. At the time of this report, there is enough information to suggest POI’s attack was motivated by a personal grievance. Due to the prevalence of proximal warning behaviors, distal characteristics, and the communal and national impact, CTG considers it appropriate to classify POI’s attack as a lone-actor, isolated domestic incident.


Intelligence Gaps:


Pre-attack:

  • Local law enforcement likely either undervalued or misinterpreted key indicators and warnings (I&Ws) available about POI’s mental health state. In May 2023, POI’s family members expressed concerns to local police over POI’s mental state and what he may do with the 10-15 guns he stockpiled from family properties. In September 2023, the US Army contacted local police expressing concerns that POI was paranoid and mentally ill. The reserves also informed police POI was committed to a mental health facility and made threats to shoot up the Saco Army reserve base. An Ellsworth police officer who served with POI confirmed similar behavior POI’s family reported, telling a local Sheriff deputy that POI accused other soldiers of calling him a sex offender.[59] POI’s training supervisor, Kelvin L. Mote, wrote a letter to the Sagadhoc Sheriff’s Office requesting they perform a “health and welfare check” on the POI. Mote wrote the letter after POI’s fellow reservists reported to Mote that POI could “pose a threat to the unit” and “refused to get help.” Mote noted POI’s mental state was deteriorating.[60]

  • After police were unable to locate POI, a Sheriff’s deputy relied on POI’s family to remove the firearms from his possession.[61] Local law enforcement very likely overly relied on POI’s family members and Army unit to ensure POI is receiving proper treatment and revoking access to his firearms, likely acting more passive than proactive based on an underlying assumption. This very likely neglected the initiation of Maine’s yellow-flag laws, likely raising concerns over why the laws aimed to take firearms away from potentially dangerous individuals were not triggered.

  • POI had a history of concerning behavior during his military training in New York, and he was hospitalized at a mental health facility.[62] There is no evidence depicting any effort to invoke New York's red flag law to restrict his access to firearms. The lack of coordination between different states' laws and law enforcement agencies very likely denotes a significant intelligence gap.

  • The local sheriff's office went to POI’s home on September 16 and reported POI could be heard moving in the trailer but did not come to the door when police knocked.[63] The absence of clear legal procedures for addressing individuals like POI can be considered an intelligence gap in law enforcement protocols.

  • Police failed to locate POI on two occasions at his home in Bowdoin, leading to a “File 6” alert indicating the POI was “armed and dangerous.” Law enforcement noted his threats against the Saco Army Reserve Base in the canceled October 18 alert.[64] The acknowledgment of POI being armed and dangerous and the failure to locate POI likely emphasizes law enforcement’s insufficient and lax actions to monitor POI as they very likely underestimated his ability to act on his threats.

During / Post-Attack:

  • Authorities received several reports indicating the presence of an active shooter at the Lewiston Walmart Distribution Center, which were later deemed false.[65] Such reports very likely strained IMAT’s resources and diverted the focus from the actual threat, almost certainly highlighting the need for a more efficient system to filter, triage, and verify incoming reports.

  • According to the timeline, authorities identified the POI as the suspected shooter at 2120 local time, almost three hours after the initial reports.[66] This intelligence gap very likely demonstrates that a prompt identification of the POI could have led to a shorter manhunt and quicker containment.

What can we DETECT and LEARN from this attack that may help us prevent another attack?

  • Policymakers should address challenges related to striking a balance between respecting civil liberties and ensuring public safety when dealing with cases of mental health concerns.

  • Law enforcement and mental health professionals should collaborate, train, and integrate a consolidated strategy into a database allowing them to detect potential threats involving individuals like POI.

  • Law enforcement agencies should conduct a thorough investigation to identify intelligence gaps and refine their prevention strategy. They should ensure that analytic divisions are incorporating alternative analysis in analytic products when confronted with reports of intent to act on threats. According to Intelligence Community Directive 203 (ICD-203), alternative analysis is “the systematic evaluation of differing hypotheses to explain events or phenomena, explore near-term outcomes, and imagine possible futures to mitigate surprise and risk.”[67]

  • Policymakers and legal professionals should address gaps in effectively utilizing flag laws to assess firearm access and protective custody based on psychological evaluations of POIs.

The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) has become the global leader in proactively fighting terrorist organizations around the world. CTG specializes in intelligence collection, and analysis, as well as investigative work to counterterrorism. CTG resources are delivered to advise clients on a business resilience process using current threat intelligence data. We scan for threats across the following regions; Africa, Central Asia, Europe, North America, South America, and Asia-Pacific. Our organization assesses evolving threats through, Worldwide Analysis of Threats, Crime, and Hazards (W.A.T.C.H.) services. Our W.A.T.C.H Officers and Digital Targeters monitor the threats posed by cyber threats, insider threats, fraud, espionage, hazards, reputational damages, violent crime, kidnappings, and bombing threats. To find out more about our products and W.A.T.C.H. services visit us at counterterrorismgroup.com.


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To read the full report, click here:

Observable Indicators and Characteristics
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[1] Robert Card, State of New Hampshire DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, https://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/hsem/news/documents/20231026-maine-shooting.pdf

[2] Maine State Police Manhunt Timeline and Incident Management, Department of Public Safety Maine State Police, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwEYFYV07RXD3OJenCjtxmcejMZub0KE/view

[3] Robert Card: The perpetrator of the Maine massacre warned a friend that he was preparing a mass shooting, El Pais, November 2023, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2023-11-01/robert-card-the-perpetrator-of-the-maine-massacre-warned-a-friend-that-he-was-preparing-a-mass-shooting.html

[4] Police identify guns left behind by Lewiston shooting suspect, Bangor Daily News, October 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/10/30/news/central-maine/gun-suspected-lewiston-shooter-car-identified/

[5] Robert Card: The perpetrator of the Maine massacre warned a friend that he was preparing a mass shooting, El Pais, November 2023, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2023-11-01/robert-card-the-perpetrator-of-the-maine-massacre-warned-a-friend-that-he-was-preparing-a-mass-shooting.html

[6] Lewiston Maine Police Department, from Facebook, via CyberHUMINT

[7] 18 killed, 13 injured in Maine mass shooting as police hunt for gunman, NBC News, October 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maine-lewiston-active-shooter-police/

[8] Ibid

[9] A teen bowler, a shipbuilder and a sign language interpreter are among the Maine shooting victims, AP New, October 2023, https://apnews.com/article/maine-shooting-victims-1be7d14e90ef6c91ca23819163d29f3e

[10] 18 killed, 13 injured in Maine mass shooting as police hunt for gunman, NBC News, October 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maine-lewiston-active-shooter-police/

[11] Maine State Police Manhunt Timeline and Incident Management, Department of Public Safety Maine State Police, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwEYFYV07RXD3OJenCjtxmcejMZub0KE/view

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Officials provide updated timeline of police response to mass shootings in Lewiston, Maine, WCVB, October 2023, https://www.wcvb.com/article/lewiston-maine-shooting-timeline-police-response/45669497#

[15] Maine State Police Manhunt Timeline and Incident Management, Department of Public Safety Maine State Police, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwEYFYV07RXD3OJenCjtxmcejMZub0KE/view

[16] Maine State Police Manhunt Timeline and Incident Management, Department of Public Safety Maine State Police, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwEYFYV07RXD3OJenCjtxmcejMZub0KE/view

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] Ibid

[20] Who was Robert Card? Confirmed details on Maine gunman, CBS News, Octobers 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-is-robert-card-confirmed-details-maine-shooting-suspect-person-of-interest/

[21] Maine mass shooting: Manhunt back on for suspect after cops serve search warrant at home, ABC News, October 2023, https://abc7chicago.com/lewiston-maine-mass-shooting-shooter-robert-card/13974278/

[22] Maine State Police Manhunt Timeline and Incident Management, Department of Public Safety Maine State Police, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwEYFYV07RXD3OJenCjtxmcejMZub0KE/view

[23] What we know about Robert Card and Maine’s deadliest mass shooting, Bangor Daily News, November 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/11/05/news/central-maine/what-we-know-about-maines-deadliest-mass-shooting-joam40zk0w/

[24] Who was Robert Card? Confirmed details on Maine gunman, CBS News, October 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-is-robert-card-confirmed-details-maine-shooting-suspect-person-of-interest/

[25] What we know about Robert Card and Maine’s deadliest mass shooting, Bangor Daily News, November 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/11/05/news/central-maine/what-we-know-about-maines-deadliest-mass-shooting-joam40zk0w/

[26] Ibid

[27] Ibid

[28] Ibid

[29] AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ARREST WARRANT (M.R.Crim.P.4(b)) AND INITIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE (M.R.Crim.P.5(d)), State of Maine, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y9_eEKbYtrgf2Ynod0Ks-xu_bX-1zrBJ/view

[30] Ibid

[31] “Assessing the threat of lone-actor terrorism: the reliability and validity of the TRAP-18”, NCBI, 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7149273/

[32] Robert Card: The perpetrator of the Maine massacre warned a friend that he was preparing a mass shooting, El Pais, November 2023, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2023-11-01/robert-card-the-perpetrator-of-the-maine-massacre-warned-a-friend-that-he-was-preparing-a-mass-shooting.html

[34] Robert Card: The perpetrator of the Maine massacre warned a friend that he was preparing a mass shooting, El Pais, November 2023, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2023-11-01/robert-card-the-perpetrator-of-the-maine-massacre-warned-a-friend-that-he-was-preparing-a-mass-shooting.html

[35] Alleged Maine gunman displayed glaring mental health signals, threatening and violent behavior, in months leading up to shooting, ABC News, October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-maine-gunman-displayed-glaring-mental-health-signals/story?id=104500818

[36] Ibid

[37] Police were warned twice since May that Robert R. Card II was armed and paranoid, Bangor Daily News, October 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/10/30/news/central-maine/police-warned-twice-since-may-that-alleged-maine-shooter-was-armed-and-paranoid/

[39] Alleged Maine gunman displayed glaring mental health signals, threatening and violent behavior, in months leading up to shooting, ABC News, October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-maine-gunman-displayed-glaring-mental-health-signals/story?id=104500818

[40] Why was Maine shooter allowed to have guns? Questions swirl in wake of massacre, AP News, November 2023, https://apnews.com/article/lewiston-maine-mass-shooting-109a533fd7a7f7083d0270da6413d565

[41] Ibid

[42] Maine mass shooting: What we know about suspect Robert Card, ABC News, October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/maine-mass-shooting-suspect/story?id=104342351

[43] Robert Card: The perpetrator of the Maine massacre warned a friend that he was preparing a mass shooting, El Pais, November 2023, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2023-11-01/robert-card-the-perpetrator-of-the-maine-massacre-warned-a-friend-that-he-was-preparing-a-mass-shooting.html

[44] Alleged Maine gunman displayed glaring mental health signals, threatening and violent behavior, in months leading up to shooting, ABC News, October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-maine-gunman-displayed-glaring-mental-health-signals/story?id=104500818

[45] Robert Card: The perpetrator of the Maine massacre warned a friend that he was preparing a mass shooting, El Pais, November 2023, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2023-11-01/robert-card-the-perpetrator-of-the-maine-massacre-warned-a-friend-that-he-was-preparing-a-mass-shooting.html

[46] Alleged Maine gunman displayed glaring mental health signals, threatening and violent behavior, in months leading up to shooting, ABC News, October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-maine-gunman-displayed-glaring-mental-health-signals/story?id=104500818

[47] Why was Maine shooter allowed to have guns? Questions swirl in wake of massacre, AP News, November 2023, https://apnews.com/article/lewiston-maine-mass-shooting-109a533fd7a7f7083d0270da6413d565

[48] Details of note left by Lewiston, Maine gunman revealed, CBC News Boston, October 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/news/lewiston-maine-gunman-robert-card-left-note/

[49] AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ARREST WARRANT (M.R.Crim.P.4(b)) AND INITIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE (M.R.Crim.P.5(d)), State of Maine, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y9_eEKbYtrgf2Ynod0Ks-xu_bX-1zrBJ/view

[50] Why was Maine shooter allowed to have guns? Questions swirl in wake of massacre, AP News, November 2023, https://apnews.com/article/lewiston-maine-mass-shooting-109a533fd7a7f7083d0270da6413d565

[51] Lewiston police identify Robert Card as a suspect in fatal shootings, NBC News, October 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/lewiston-maine-shooting-robert-card-what-know-rcna122262

[52] Ibid

[53] Alleged Maine gunman displayed glaring mental health signals, threatening and violent behavior, in months leading up to shooting, ABC News, October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-maine-gunman-displayed-glaring-mental-health-signals/story?id=104500818

[54] Ibid

[55] US Army warned Maine suspect too 'erratic' to have gun, BBC, October 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67263059

[56] Police were warned twice since May that Robert R. Card II was armed and paranoid, Bangor Daily News, October 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/10/30/news/central-maine/police-warned-twice-since-may-that-alleged-maine-shooter-was-armed-and-paranoid/

[57] Ibid

[59] Police were warned twice since May that Robert R. Card II was armed and paranoid, Bangor Daily News, October 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/10/30/news/central-maine/police-warned-twice-since-may-that-alleged-maine-shooter-was-armed-and-paranoid/

[60] Fellow reservists feared Maine gunman had guns, might 'snap', ABC News, November 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/US/fellow-reservist-feared-maine-gunman-guns-snap/story?id=104593548

[61] Army decided Maine shooting gunman Robert Card shouldn't have a weapon after erratic behavior in July, October 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maine-shooting-robert-card-police-check-army/

[62] Police were warned twice since May that Robert R. Card II was armed and paranoid, Bangor Daily News, October 2023, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2023/10/30/news/central-maine/police-warned-twice-since-may-that-alleged-maine-shooter-was-armed-and-paranoid/

[63] Ibid

[64] Ibid

[65] Ibid

[66] Maine State Police Manhunt Timeline and Incident Management, Department of Public Safety Maine State Police, October 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwEYFYV07RXD3OJenCjtxmcejMZub0KE/view

[67] Analytic Standards, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf

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