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FLASH ALERT: US CONDUCTS LARGE-SCALE ATTACK ON VENEZUELA; PRESIDENT MADURO AND WIFE CAPTURED AND INDICTED ON CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT NARCOTERRORISM; INSTABILITY IN THE REGION EXPECTED

(The Flash Alert [FA] is a near real-time brief of a possible threat or situation being monitored by The Counter Threat Center. The information is accurate at the time of reporting, but may be subject to change.)


Lydia Baccino, Khushi Salian, Ignacio Valdés Fuentes, Emily Katrina Bustillos, Chiara Michieli NORTHCOM & SOUTHCOM 

Elizabeth Fignar, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

January 4, 2026

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Venezuelan Flag[1]


The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) is issuing a FLASH ALERT to the citizens and militaries of Venezuela and the US following the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US Special Forces. On January 3, 2026, the US conducted a large-scale strike on Venezuela with President Trump confirming the attack and capture on his social media app, Truth Social.[2] This attack on Venezuela comes after months of tension between the Trump administration and Maduro, including strikes on boats on the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean, allegedly smuggling narcotics into the US. There have been 35 confirmed attacks, killing approximately 115 people.[3] In 2020, Maduro and other officials were accused of “conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism” with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) issuing a new indictment for Maduro and his wife for their involvement.[4] Trump stated the US government would run Venezuela in the interim period with Hegseth, Caine and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, working with the people of Venezuela.[5] Trump stated in a press conference, “We’re going to make sure that that country is run properly. We’re not doing this in vain… This is a very dangerous attack. This is an attack that could have gone very, very badly.”[6] Concerns from neighbouring countries, such as Colombia and Brazil, have arisen as Trump has not ruled out a continued US presence in Venezuela, saying, “We’re not afraid of boots on the ground if we have to… We had boots on the ground last night.”[7]


CTG is on HIGH alert due to the heightened risk of rapid escalation following the US military strikes in Venezuela and the threat of further intervention by political leadership. President Trump’s narrative VERY LIKELY indicates the shift toward a direct involvement policy for South America. The situation LIKELY mirrors historical US interventions in Latin America, LIKELY prompting a protracted conflict. Nicolás Maduro’s administration will VERY LIKELY go through a vacuum of power in the country. The Maduro power sphere will LIKELY look forward to international allies for support, while a few Venezuelan officials have a ROUGHLY EVEN CHANCE of reaching agreements with the US, polarizing the internal scenario. The unstable security architecture of the region will LIKELY cause a wave of migration from Venezuela towards neighbouring countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana. Narcoterrorist and guerrilla organizations will VERY LIKELY take advantage of the internal situation in the country. The stability of the region is at HIGH risk.


Introduction 

On January 3, 2026, early morning local time, the US conducted a large-scale attack on the Venezuelan capital Caracas.[8] The US Army Delta Force carried out the strike to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on the accusation of having collaborated with narco-terrorists.[9] At the time of reporting, hospitals in Caracas have declared more than 90 injuries of military personnel being treated in Carlos Alvero Military hospital and Fuerte Tiuna small hospital,[10] while 40 people, including civilian and military workforce, died.[11] The regime announced a state of emergency and declared the attack a “very serious military aggression.”[12] On the US side, Trump has confirmed that a few American soldiers were injured, while a US helicopter was hit.[13] 


The capture of the Venezuelan president and his wife, Cilia, came after the US filed an indictment against the president in 2020.[14] The US administration charged Maduro and other senior officials with colluding with narco-terrorist groups like the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) of trafficking weapons and drugs like cocaine into the US.[15] The official indictment against Maduro linked the Venezuelan leader with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Tren de Aragua narco-cartel.[16] According to the US document, Venezuelan officials, including Maduro, had operated together with narcoterrorist organizations, converting the country into a secure place for drug traffickers and terrorists, allowing them to operate through the Caribbean and the North American region, reaching the US since 1999.[17] Since September 2, 2025, the Trump administration’s campaign of “war on drugs” has killed more than 110 people in more than 30 attacks, alleging that strikes were on ships trafficking narcotics.[18]  The US Iwo Jima, an amphibious assault vessel, moved the Venezuelan president and his wife out of the country[19] and shifted them via plane to the Metropolitan Detention Centre in Brooklyn, New York.[20] The Trump administration will prosecute the president and his wife on the same charges as in 2020.[21] Along with Maduro and his wife, their son Nicholas and three other defendants have been indicted with conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism, conspiracy to conduct cocaine import, and trafficking weapons.[22] On January 3, 2026, at 1100 EST,[23] Trump held a press conference at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida to relay details of the attack, where he stated that the US will run Venezuela until they transfer power to someone who has Venezuelan interests in mind.[24] There is no confirmation on how the Trump administration plans to manage the Latin American nation while Maduro’s government is still active.[25] Trump has stated that administering Venezuela will be easier with the country’s oil reserves and won’t be a financial burden.[26] Venezuela holds the largest reserves of oil in the world, and with just over 3030 billion barrels, has the potential to exert influence in the global oil and energy market, leading to major consequences in the world economy.[27]

US intervention in the southern part of the continent, rooted in the Monroe Doctrine, reached its high point during the Cold War in the 20th century to protect US national interest against the communist and socialist bloc.[28] Roosevelt expanded the Doctrine, securing the US position in the continent, justifying the use of military action to ensure national stability and reinforce US interests.[29] US intervention involved undercover operations by CIA to overthrow governments, such as during the Guatemalan intervention in 1954, that inaugurated the model for the support of dictatorships in South America, such as the Chilean dictator in the 1970s to 1980s.[30] Direct intervention with troop mobilization in the region marked the relationship between the US and the rest of the continent, such as the invasion of Grenada in 1979.[31] One of the most well-known examples of the US intervention was the US support of dictatorships through Operation Condor, a movement of political suppression which ended with high estimates of 60,000 deaths.[32]  There have been mixed reactions to the US’s move to capture the Venezuelan president worldwide.[33] Countries such as Russia, Iran, Mexico, Brazil, and China condemned the action.[34] In 2025, Russia and Venezuela ratified the Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation.[35] The 10-year pact elevates bilateral relations to a level of strategic cooperation.[36] The treaty explicitly mandates mutual interaction in the areas of security, defense, and counter-terrorism, while also establishing a roadmap for joint energy projects and an independent financial infrastructure to bypass Western sanctions.[37] European countries like France and Ukraine have supported the move for a democratic transition and called for prioritising the interests of the Venezuelan people, while Germany, Spain, the UK, and Denmark have maintained a neutral stance advocating for respect of international law.[38]  South American governments such as Colombia, Perú, and Chile, which are among the most affected countries by the Venezuelan migration crisis,[39] have issued mixed declarations. Chilean President Gabriel Boric had launched an official communication condemning US actions and Trump’s announcement to run Venezuela.[40] Boric stated that the threat of unilateral control of natural resources by external powers is an attack against the soverighnity of every country in the southamerican region, hinting that Venezuela could be the first of many other US military interventions in the continent, breaking the democracy of the nations.[41] The newly elected president of Chile, José Antonio Kast, supported the intervention following the narcoterrorism accusation against Maduro.[42]  Colombian President Gustavo Petro condemned this attack on his X account, calling for respect of the UN principles of dialogue and diplomatic channels.[43] The Colombian government had taken measures to secure the Colombian-Venezuelan border stability, addressing the possibility of new migratory waves. [44] The president deployed its military along the lines of the Venezuelan border,[45] while assessing the migration pattern through its “real-time analysis system.”[46] José Jeri, president of Perú, celebrated Trump's operation, declaring that it is time for a new prosperity era in the region.[47] Perú has reinforced its northern border too.[48] This incident is the most upfront US attack since the Panama invasion in 1989.[49] 


Regarding the internal dynamics in Venezuela, Colectivos are grassroots, paramilitary-style groups that support Maduro’s government. They emerged from the Bolivarian Party and operate with state officials' protection. They are closely associated with Maduro’s political base as they coordinate with security forces in the repression of protests, media, and intimidation of opposition supporters.[50] Venezuela maintains organized militia structures, notably the Milicia Nacional Bolivariana (FAES), composed of civilian volunteers pro-Maduro. The Maduro administration portrays these militias as “people's army” ready to defend the nation against external threats.[51] The ELN, Colombia’s largest active guerrilla group, has a major presence in the Catatumbo region, in the Colombia-Venezuela border, where controls are weak.[52] 

Immigrants from Venezuela have mainly reacted positively, showing their support for the Delta Force operation, gathering in the streets of Colombia,[53] Chile,[54] Perú, and other countries.[55] Many migrants have stated their intention to return to Venezuela.[56] The main Venezuelan cities, such as La Guajira and Caracas, have blockades, gatherings, and patrols of pro-government armed civilians.[57] People not supporting the Maduro administration have decided to stay home due to fear of reprisal from pro-Maduro supporters. Cars line up for gasoline, people queue outside of pharmacies, markets, and small food businesses to stock food amid the crisis and uncertainty.[58] 


Analysis

The capture of Nicolás Maduro and the US’s public threat of ground intervention will very likely strengthen opposition and militant anti-Maduro factions within the country. The declaration of a state of emergency very likely signals the beginning of public resistance. The US will likely carry out additional strikes if the Venezuelan military does not surrender. As Venezuela’s conventional military capacity is limited, there’s a roughly even chance of pro-regime armed groups, residual security forces, and non-state actors engaging in localized violence as a means of resistance and support. Maduro’s capture will very likely create a governance vacuum in Venezuela, prompting fragmentation within Venezuelan military forces, civilian structures, and political authority, as there is no information at the time of an internal or official successor. Civilian officials, military commanders, anti-Maduro political factions, and the US administration will very likely compete for authority. The undermined centralized control will very likely allow armed criminal groups, such as the ELN or Tren de Aragua, to exploit instability and expand their operations on land, targeting civilians and political figures. There will likely be a split within security forces, aligning with local powers, US authorities, or waiting for a resolution on the Maduro situation. There’s a roughly even chance that Maduro’s capture was a negotiated exit, suggesting that some elite Venezuelan segments are preparing for a transition. This possibility very likely increases elite competition, especially among Senior Military Commanders and the Chavista political bureaucracy, for power and immediate negotiation with key allies. The remaining Venezuelan administration will very likely seek allied countries' support. Russia will likely take covert measures to secure its interests and contrast the US, following its Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation. This dynamic will very likely contribute to a higher-risk environment for competitive escalation, including proxy activity, without immediate Russian conventional confrontation or military action. The US intervention in Venezuela almost certainly focuses on taking control of its oil reserves. The public declaration that Washington will run Venezuela will very likely prompt asymmetric responses from the remaining Maduro-aligned organizations, likely targeting US diplomatic assets, prompting localized violence in major cities, or sabotaging through Colectivos. The US involvement in the energy sector very likely suggests the objective of extending beyond leadership removal to structural influence over state functions. This rhetoric, combined with the use of Delta forces to capture Maduro and his wife, very likely signals a transition from limited action to active enforcement, reducing political and operational constraints on sustained US involvement. As resistance dynamics evolve, this posture will very likely shape SOUTHCOM’s planning towards continued expanded intelligence collection and military positioning, preserving escalation options if conditions deteriorate.

The direct military action represents a substantial escalation in the US-Latin America relationship, very likely worsening the concerns among countries about US military intervention in the region. Latin American governments’ responses will very likely increase polarization within the region and international organizations. They will very likely weaken collective security mechanisms, such as cooperative approaches to crisis management or shared positions in international organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), or Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). This development will very likely become a focal point for strong political movements across the region, contributing to increased polarization between governments for national interests, threat perceptions, and external alignment considerations. There’s a roughly even chance that the countries pursuing public neutrality will consider regional agreements, alliances, or work on security readiness along borders and critical infrastructure to protect themselves.


This crisis will likely disrupt regional markets, especially energy and trade, transitioning from a state of diplomatic tension to active supply-chain disruption. Uncertainty surrounding production, control, and export routes will likely affect regional trade flows and economic stability, particularly for neighboring states with existing commercial and energy dependencies. The removal of Venezuela’s heavy-sour barrels will very likely force a shift in regional trade flows, increasing operational costs for diesel-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and trucking in the region. Countries dependent on Venezuelan oil or regional trade corridors will likely face supply chain interruptions and inflationary dynamics, while financial markets will likely respond to the uncertainty with increased risk aversion toward Latin American assets. Disruptions to trade, fuel access, and supply chains will likely intensify population movement, strain local services, and increase uncertainty among border communities in the near term. Neighboring countries already affected by migration will very likely face strained reception capacity and resource shortages. The economic shock and security fragmentation will almost certainly worsen the humanitarian situation along Venezuela’s borders, likely negatively affecting regional perceptions of Venezuelan migrants and displaced populations.

Migration surges, disruption of cross-border trade, and transnational criminal networks will very likely increase in the upcoming weeks. This situation will likely end in a great-power competition, undermining regional security cohesion. There is a roughly even chance of two new migratory waves in the short and long term. Immigrant communities in the closest countries, such as Colombia, have a roughly even chance of going back to Venezuela. South American countries are likely to allow this massive return as a solution to the migratory crisis. Old generation migrants from pre-2020s waves are unlikely to return as they have almost certainly regularized their migratory status in foreign countries. New waves of migration from Venezuela are very likely to occur in the short term, especially to countries that actively condemn US intervention, such as Brazil and Colombia. Criminal networks such as narcoterrorism groups or guerrilla members will very likely change their focus to migration and human trafficking, as their drug operations will likely get disrupted by US intervention.

Recommendations

The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that the civilian population take shelter and avoid sensitive locations, including government buildings, ports, airports, and military bases. Foreigners in Venezuela should contact their diplomatic representatives and consular offices and prepare for possible evacuation from the country. In particular, US citizens currently in Venezuela should monitor the US Embassy in Venezuela's website[59] for updates and to contact the US Embassy in Bogota[60] or the US Department of State’s Consular Affairs Office to request assistance on how to ensure their personal safety. They should establish multiple, stable communication channels with friends and relatives outside Venezuela to communicate in real time any security developments.


Travelers should avoid Venezuela and follow the travel advisories and updates. Any foreign national who can leave the country safely should do so until the situation stabilizes. Foreigners needing to enter or exit Venezuela should contact their respective diplomatic missions and services in the country to obtain specific instructions and coordinate their safe travel. They should inform their governments of their presence in Venezuela and register on official websites to ensure they are accounted for in any potential evacuation plan.  Travelers to nearby nations should check the situation in the Caribbean and confirm their flight status with the airlines before departing to avoid being stranded.


Venezuelan citizens should prepare for possible domestic instability, fragmentation of the armed forces, and increased presence of organized criminal groups. People should monitor the development of the local security situation, avoid large gatherings in public places, including demonstrations, in the coming weeks, and reduce their public activities. Civilians should be mindful of the potential increase in organized criminal groups' actions in the region and increase awareness.


Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations operating in Venezuela should constantly assess the threat environment to ensure the effectiveness of their operations and the security of their personnel. They should prepare for worsening humanitarian conditions in the event of an escalation, including large-scale shortages of food and medicine. They should strengthen security around their operations and storage to prevent attacks by organized criminal groups.


Humanitarian operators should establish the necessary infrastructure to support a potentially high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Venezuela's neighboring countries, such as Colombia and Brazil, should prepare for a possible surge in migratory flows and a humanitarian crisis at the Venezuelan border. They should consider establishing temporary camps along the border to support those trying to flee the country by land.


Countries in the region should closely monitor the developing situation to assess the threat of violent spillovers, including additional US airstrikes against countries such as Colombia. The Organization of American States and other international and regional organizations should mediate between regional stakeholders and encourage all parties to respect international law and uphold human rights. Governments from the most affected countries by Venezuela's migratory crisis, such as Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil, should monitor public manifestations of immigrants and provide security measures to avoid possible civilian conflicts and minimize political appropriation by radical actors within the countries.


CTG assesses that the current threat climate is HIGH given the rapid deterioration of the security situation in Venezuela, prompted by the US attack against key military and logistic infrastructure in the country and the taking of Venezuelan President Maduro. The situation will likely worsen in the coming days, with Maduro’s exit very likely creating a power vacuum that could exacerbate political instability and enhance divisions within Venezuela’s armed forces. This event will very likely negatively impact the regional security environment, with a roughly even chance of violent spillovers to neighboring countries, such as Colombia. Concerns over renewed US regime-change strategies in Latin America will very likely exacerbate political tensions across the continent, with some US allies, such as Milei, likely welcoming the US stance.


Analysis indicates that there is a HIGH PROBABILITY of conflict escalation if the Venezuelan military forces do not surrender. US actions will VERY LIKELY spark international outrage and concerns about a potential neoimperialist posture in Latin America, LIKELY increasing regional polarization and weakening collective security mechanisms. The possible US seizure of Venezuela’s oil reserves will LIKELY prompt Maduro’s allies, such as Russia, to take covert measures to secure their interests in the region. The rapidly deteriorating security environment will VERY LIKELY trigger large-scale migratory flows and a humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.

[1] Venezuealan Flag, generated by a third party database

[2] realDonaldTrump, Truth Social, January 3, 2026, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115830428767897167

[3] The United States attacks Venezuela and claims that President Nicolás Maduro was captured and taken out of the country, AP, January 2026, https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-eeuu-explosiones-caracas-622416e846688f33c969256039349cb2 

[4] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Trump: US is 'not afraid of boots on the ground' in Venezuela, AP, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35NDROGiy5s 

[8] Trump says Venezuela's Maduro has been captured after large-scale strikes, France 24, January 2026, https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20260103-multiple-explosions-aircraft-sounds-reported-in-venezuela-caracas-maduro-trumpersonnel,p

[9] Trump says "we're going to run" Venezuela after Maduro's capture until peaceful transition takes place, CBS News, January 2026,  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nicolas-maduro-captured-venezuela-attack-trump-fox/

[10]  Hospitals in Caracas are reporting more than 90 injured military personnel and “several” deaths - Internal hospital report shows, Live Universal Awareness Map, January 2026,  https://venezuela.liveuamap.com/en/2026/3-january-20-hospitals-in-caracas-are-reporting-more-than

[11] Venezuelan Official Says at Least 40 People Were Killed in US Attack, The New York Times, January 2026,  https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/world/americas/venezuela-airstrike-civilian-deaths.html

[12] The Chavista dictatorship reported attacks on military targets and declared a state of emergency in Venezuela, Infobae, January 2026, https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2026/01/03/la-dictadura-de-maduro-reporto-ataques-sobre-objetivos-militares-y-declaro-el-estado-de-emergencia-en-venezuela/ (Translated by Google)

[13] US captures Maduro, carries out 'large scale strike' in Venezuela: Trump, ABC News, January 2026, https://abcnews.go.com/International/explosions-heard-venezuelas-capital-city-caracas/story?id=128861598

[14] Trump says "we're going to run" Venezuela after Maduro's capture until peaceful transition takes place, CBS News, January 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nicolas-maduro-captuthe tored-venezuela-attack-trump-fox/

[15] Ibid

[16] What is the relationship between the FARC dissidents, the ELN, and the Tren de Aragua with Nicolás Maduro? This is what the formal indictment states, Semana, January 2026, https://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/cual-es-la-relacion-entre-las-disidencias-de-las-farc-el-eln-y-el-tren-de-aragua-con-nicolas-maduro-esto-es-lo-que-dice-el-documento-de-acusacion-formal/202641/ (Translated by Google)

[17] Ibid.

[18] US military says five killed in latest strike on alleged drug boats, BBC, December 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czdq1ple2l4o

[19] US captures Maduro, carries out 'large scale strike' in Venezuela: Trump, ABC News, January 2026,  https://abcnews.go.com/International/explosions-heard-venezuelas-capital-city-caracas/story?id=128861598

[20] What We Know About the US Operation in Venezuela, The New York Times, January 2026,  https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-capture-trump.html

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] @WhiteHouse, X, January 3, 2026,

[25] Ibid

[26] Ibid

[27] Venezuela is a giant in reserves and a dwarf in production in the world oil market: what can change, Infobae, January 2026, https://www.infobae.com/economia/2026/01/03/venezuela-es-un-gigante-de-reservas-y-un-enano-productivo-en-el-mercado-petrolero-mundial-que-puede-cambiar/ (Translated by Google)

[28] US interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean haven't always gone as planned, NPR, January 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5652133/us-venezuela-interventionism-caribbean-latin-america-history-trump 

[29] Ibid

[30] Ibid

[31] Ibid

[33] World reacts to US strikes on Venezuela, Reuters, January 2026,  https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/world-reacts-us-strikes-venezuela-2026-01-03/

[34] Ibid

[35] Venezuela’s Strategic Pivot: Forging Deeper Bonds with Russia Amid Mounting Pressures, The Rio Times, October 2025,  https://www.riotimesonline.com/venezuelas-strategic-pivot-forging-deeper-bonds-with-russia-amid-mounting-pressures/

[36] Ibid

[37] Putin and Venezuela's Maduro sign strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, Reuters, May 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/putin-maduro-sign-strategic-partnership-agreement-2025-05-07/ 

[38] Ibid

[39] About the regional Venezuela Situation, International Organization for Migration UN Migration, https://respuestavenezolanos.iom.int/en/about-regional-venezuela-situation 

[40] President Boric condemns US attack: "Today it's Venezuela, tomorrow it could be anyone", Meganoticias, January 2026, https://www.meganoticias.cl/nacional/511077-boric-condena-ataque-eeuu-venezuela-detencion-maduro-manana-podria-ser-cualquier-otro-3-1-2025.html (Translated by Google)

[41] Ibid

[42] @joseantoniokast, X, January 3, 2026, https://x.com/joseantoniokast/status/2007456165547102659 

[43] @petrogustavo, X, January 3, 2026, https://x.com/petrogustavo/status/2007356950514729388 

[44] Ibid

[45] Colombian President says troops deployed to Venezuela border after US attacks, The Hindu, January 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/colombian-president-says-troops-deployed-to-venezuela-border-after-us-attacks/article70468380.ece

[46] Colombia calls for a UN Security Council session this Monday, January 5, following the US military operation in Venezuela, El Tiempo, January 2026, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/colombia-convoca-a-sesion-del-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu-este-lunes-5-de-enero-tras-operacion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-venezuela-3521668 (Translated by Google)

[47] @josejeriore, X, January 3, 2026, https://x.com/josejeriore/status/2007485825794150675 

[48] Ibid

[50] What are the colectivos and how do they operate to "defend the Bolivarian revolution" in Venezuela?, BBC News, July 2017, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40527998 (Translated by Google)

[51] Venezuela: The FAES, the controversial elite police force created by Nicolás Maduro, accused of being an "extermination group", BBC, December 2019, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50677411 (Translated by Google)

[52] Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region, AP, January 2025, https://apnews.com/article/colombia-eln-rebels-talks-suspended-2d0d3bdf85e5306aad3479693ec1d10c 

[53] “Long live a free and democratic Venezuela”: massive gathering of Venezuelans in Bolívar Square, Bogotá, Semana, January 2026, https://www.semana.com/nacion/bogota/articulo/viva-venezuela-libre-with itsy-en-democracia-multitudinaria-concentracion-de-venezolanos-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar-en-bogota/202654/ (Translated by Google)

[54] "In two months there will be no Venezuelans left in Chile": Migrante celebrates the capture of Nicolás Maduro with euphoria, Meganoticias, January 2026, https://www.meganoticias.cl/nacional/511063-venezolanos-celebran-captura-nicolas-maduro-estacion-central-en-dos-meses-no-va-a-quedar-ningun-venezolano-en-chile-03-01-2026.html (Translated by Google)

[55] Venezuela diaspora celebrates Maduro's deposition, wonders what's next, Reuters, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-diaspora-celebrates-maduros-deposition-wonders-whats-next-2026-01-03/ 

[56] Ibid

[57] Photos show people reacting to the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, AP, January 2026, https://apnews.com/photo-gallery/venezuela-us-explosions-caracas-25a01a23e7b936b430901428ab0d0907 

[58] This is what the streets of Caracas look like after the arrest of dictator Nicolás Maduro, Infobae, January 2026, https://www.infobae.com/fotos/2026/01/03/asi-estan-las-calles-de-caracas-tras-la-detencion-del-dictador-nicolas-maduro/ (Translated by Google)

[59] US Embassy in Venezuela, https://ve.usembassy.gov/ 

[60] US Embassy Bogota, Colombia, Tel. +57-1-275-2000 or 601-275-2000, https://co.usembassy.gov/services/contact-acs-form/

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