Favour Godwill, Jacqueline Heier, WATCH/GSOC Team
Archie Archie, Angelina Sammarco Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
November 27, 2024
Ballistic Missile Carrier[1]
Event: On November 27, 2024, the state-run Russian News Agency (TASS) reported that the Russian Federation continues to develop its RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a key element of its nuclear capabilities. The RS-28 Sarmat has a targeting range of over thousands of miles, can carry multiple nuclear warheads, possesses hypersonic capabilities, and poses a strategic risk to both Europe and the US. Despite reports of testing deferrals and a recent testing failure, the RS-28 Sarmat is being prepared for combat duty, representing an advancement in its integration into Russia’s nuclear arsenal.[2] Under the New New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty between the US and Russia, each party should exchange information on their weapon system and facilities to ensure they are within the treaty's verifiable limits on all deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons.[3]
Significance: Russia’s dedication to developing the RS-28 Sarmat likely increases the threat threshold of international nuclear proliferation, even if it is unlikely to be combat-ready. The missile’s allegedly advanced design, including hypersonic capabilities, will likely complicate the New START Treaty arms control framework aimed at maintaining a stable nuclear balance. The RS-28 Sarmat’s maneuverability and ability to evade anti-missile defense systems will likely render traditional methods of monitoring missile flight paths, such as satellite-based tracking and radar detection systems, unreliable. This will very likely reduce the effectiveness of monitoring systems. Given that the New START Treaty relies on verification measures such as data exchange and on-site measures, the RS-28 Sarmat’s ability to carry more warheads than traditional missiles will likely make it difficult for the US to verify Russia’s compliance with the treaty. Escalating political tensions between Russia and NATO will very likely delay on-site inspections of the RS-28 Sarmat missile program. The US will very likely question the full capabilities and number of strategic warheads on the missile, likely eroding confidence in the treaty’s ability to limit the capacity of Russia’s intercontinental-range nuclear weapons.
Russia's deployment of the RS-28 Sarmat will likely complicate future negotiations on arms control agreements, particularly if there are doubts about its compliance with the treaty regarding the advancement of the Sarmat program. Nuclear-capable countries such as the US, UK, China, and Israel will likely begin to strengthen their nuclear arsenals, very likely undermining efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally and increasing preexisting tensions between nuclear-capable countries. There is a roughly even chance that Russia’s ongoing development of the RS-28 Sarmat missile will renew an arms race between countries such as Russia, the US, and China. Potential nuclear-armed states’ efforts to modernize or expand their arsenals will likely be a strategic effort to maintain deterrence. There is a roughly even chance that Russia will not extend the duration of the treaty after its termination, following the advanced features of the RS-28 Sarmat missile and its enhanced nuclear arsenal.
Recommendations
The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) increase robust monitoring of Russia’s development of the Sarmat missile.
UNODA should encourage security dialogues supporting Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ) to dissuade nuclear-capable countries, such as the US, UK, China, Israel, and Pakistan, from developing nuclear weapons, while encouraging nuclear disarmament and conversion procedures of missile launchers.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) should promote the resumption of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, such as in the Conference of Disarmament (CD), to promote multilateral frameworks beyond the US-Russia New START bilateral agreements.
The US should push for new protocols within the New START Treaty framework to ensure that the Sarmat missile is subject to the same transparency and verification standards as existing systems. These protocols should enhance data-sharing requirements to improve confidence in compliance and prevent circumvention of arms control limits.
UNODA should encourage the development of further confidence-building measures and nuclear risk mechanisms, such as de-escalation procedures, early warning systems, and nuclear de-alerting, to increase transparency and lower the chance of conflict escalation.
The UN General Assembly should recommend a global conference on nuclear weapons reductions, inviting all nuclear-armed states to discuss new arms control initiatives.
If there is any additional and or critical information please contact us at The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) by Telephone 202-643-2848 or email info@counterterrorismgroup.com
[1] Ballistic Missile Carrier, generated by a third party database
[2] Russia is still working to deploy Sarmat intercontinental missile, TASS says, Reuters, November 2024,
[3] New START Treaty, US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/new-start/