IN DENMARK, UNKNOWN DRONES DISRUPT FLIGHTS AT AALBORG AIRPORT, AND IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, ANONYMOUS TIKTOK ACCOUNTS PROMOTE RADICAL PARTIES, SPREADING ANTI-EU SENTIMENTS AND PRO-RUSSIAN NARRATIVES
- Senior Editor
- Oct 5
- 4 min read
September 25-October 1, 2025 | Issue 37 - EUCOM Team
Chiara Michieli, Jacob Fields, José Heras Luna, Leon Kille, Indira Hankins, Mireia Fonseca, Cristina Calvo
Camilla Raffaelli, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
Airport Terminal at Night[1]
Date: September 25, 2025
Location: Aalborg, North Jutland Region, Denmark
Parties involved: Denmark; Danish Ministry of Defence; Danish Defence; Danish Defence Command; Danish law enforcement; Danish police; Danish citizens; Danish private individuals; Sweden; Norway
The event: Unidentified drones disrupted operations at Aalborg Airport, affecting military and commercial flights.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
The unidentified drone sightings will very likely test the capabilities of the Danish Defence, likely exposing gaps in its ability to counter aerial threats. Denmark will very likely continue facing operational gaps in countering sustained or coordinated aerial threats, likely leading to a lack of detection of small or low-flying drones and responses to swarming tactics. This incident will very likely have lasting implications for national security planning, almost certainly forcing the Ministry of Defence and Danish Defence Command to reevaluate whether current defense timelines, integration, and readiness are sufficient to address threats. These vulnerabilities very likely leave Denmark exposed to future aerial threats, such as surveillance and sensitive information gathering operations, likely from unmanned systems targeting critical infrastructure.
Unclear attribution and public service disruption will likely increase citizens’ attention to unidentified flying objects and UAVs, very likely resulting in a significant rise in drone sighting reports in Denmark and other Northern European countries, such as Sweden and Norway. There is a roughly even chance that Danish citizens will interpret the legal operation of drones by private individuals as a potential threat, likely magnifying the number of unfounded police calls and diverting law enforcement resources away from addressing actual attacks. Building tensions from the latest drone-sighting incidents will very likely prompt disproportionate concern over the issue, likely leading citizens to report non-drone-related incidents. This dynamic will very likely exacerbate the broader sense of insecurity among citizens, likely increasing their vulnerability to such hybrid attacks in the region and enhancing the latter’s effectiveness.
Date: September 28, 2025
Location: Czech Republic
Parties involved: Czech Republic; Czech government; Czech radical political parties; Czech voters; Czech citizens; NATO; EU; EU countries; EU citizens; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) specialized in monitoring and countering disinformation such as Alliance4Europe; regional media observatory Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO); Russia; Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operators; Kremlin-aligned networks; social networks; social media influencers spreading disinformation; Chinese social media company TikTok; anonymous TikTok accounts; online audiences
The event: Anonymous TikTok accounts have been promoting radical political parties advancing anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiment, and pro-Russia narratives, ahead of the parliamentary election.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
The coordinated activity of the anonymous TikTok accounts will likely normalize fringe narratives, likely by strengthening radical parties online and encouraging their mobilization offline. The Czech government’s failure to address the amplification of radical parties through these networks will likely embed anti-EU and anti-Western stances into mainstream political discourse, very likely creating an environment where foreign-influenced propaganda becomes a legitimate component of political debate. This will likely distort perceptions of political momentum, giving radical parties an appearance of broader legitimacy, with a roughly even chance of influencing undecided voters. The increased online spread of anti-EU sentiments will likely aim at affecting citizens’ behaviour offline, likely pushing them to protest or stage political rallies as a strategic tool to make voters believe they are the majority.
Regional media observatories, such as CEDMO, will likely identify the spread of pro-Russia narratives on TikTok as part of broader Kremlin-aligned propaganda efforts across the EU, likely prompting the EU to strengthen countermeasures. The EU will likely tighten compliance checks under the Digital Services Act (DSA) and expand cooperation with specialized NGOs, like Alliance4Europe. Collaboration with NGOs through public campaigns and educational initiatives will likely enhance social awareness about EU counter-disinformation projects, such as the EUvsDisinfo initiative, helping EU citizens critically evaluate propaganda campaigns. Such initiatives will likely fortify EU countries’ information environments by limiting the visibility of propaganda campaigns and reinforcing citizen trust in the EU’s counter-disinformation efforts, narrowing the space for pro-Russia narratives to shape public debate.
The detection of the Kremlin-aligned networks’ FIMI operation in the Czech Republic will very likely prompt them to employ more complex and unconventional technology. These networks will almost certainly seek to hinder detection and tracking efforts, very likely evolving their FIMI campaigns through blockchain-based social networks and micro-targeted messaging. FIMI-focused adversary networks will very likely exploit social media influencers to spread misinformation and pro-Russia narratives, very likely leading Russian FIMI operators to shift their efforts to less regulated platforms. These united efforts will very likely leverage the lack of direct links to the Kremlin to make their stances feel more genuine to online audiences.
[1] Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, by Tech. Sgt. Robert Barnett, licensed under Public Domain (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD/DoW endorsement.)
[2] Indsats mod uidentificerede droner over Aalborg Lufthavn afsluttet, North Jutland Police, September 2025, https://politi.dk/nordjyllands-politi/nyhedsliste/pm2-njyl/2025/09/25 (Translated by Google)
[3] Anonymous TikTok accounts backing radical parties before Czech vote, study finds, Reuters, September 2025,
