top of page

JNIM CLAIMS ITS FIRST ATTACK IN NIGERIA, AND THE SCHEDULED DELIVERIES OF F-16V FIGHTER JETS AND GLIDE BOMBS FOR TAIWAN EXPERIENCE DELAYS

October 30-November 5, 2025 | Issue 42 - Weapons & Tactics

Nimaya Premachandra, Matan Lieberman, Victoria Kotey, Lucy Gibson, W/T

Elizabeth Fignar, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

 

ree

Nigerian Soldier [1]


Date: October 30, 2025

Location: Nigeria

Parties involved: Nigeria; Nigerian counterterrorism authorities; Nigerian Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units; Al-Qaeda linked militant group Jama’t Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); JNIM-affiliated militants; ideologically-affiliated groups; Nigerian jihadist militant group Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa (Ansaru); jihadist militant group Boko Haram; Islamist extremist group Islamic State West Africa Province (lSWAP); recruits; local criminal gangs and bandits; non-Muslim civilians; civilians; local communities; Mali; Burkina Faso

The event: JNlM claimed its first attack in Nigeria.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Nigeria will very likely increase resources for the development of new counterterrorism operations in Nigeria’s western regions, likely slowing down the militant group’s expansion into Nigeria in the short run. To prevent the infiltration of JNIM-affiliated militants from Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria will very likely impose strict security measures at its western borders, likely soliciting assistance through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to improve the capacity of border infrastructure, such as fences and biometric surveillance systems. Nigeria will very likely couple enhanced border security measures with increased resource allocation to the defense of military bases and main roads, likely prioritizing Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units and IED detection systems. Heightened attention of Nigerian counterterrorism authorities towards JNIM will very likely divert resources away from existing initiatives to counter Boko Haram and ISWAP in the northeast, very likely increasing the risk of harm to non-Muslim civilians in the region, even with restricted JNIM activity.

  • JNIM will very likely pursue partnerships with local, ideologically-affiliated groups such as Ansaru to expand its influence in the country, likely increasing tensions with ISWAP. Ansaru will likely leverage its familiarity with Nigerian territory to provide JNIM with assistance in weapons procurement, provision of services and resources to local communities, and recruitment, very likely increasing military pressure on ISWAP and challenging its traditional supply routes. ISWAP will very likely perceive increased JNIM expansion and cooperation with Ansaru in Western Nigeria as a threat, likely increasing attacks against Ansaru bases and civilian territories within Ansaru’s area of operation to prevent it from gaining a foothold. Competition over recruits and local dominance with JNIM and Ansaru has a roughly even chance of motivating ISWAP to pursue cooperation with local criminal gangs and bandits in western Nigeria, likely conducting joint kidnappings and targeted killings.


Date: November 3, 2025

Location: Taiwan

Parties involved: Taiwan; Taiwanese National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST); Taiwan’s military suppliers; foreign arms suppliers; US; US defense contractors; China

The event: Scheduled US deliveries of F-16V fighter jets and US-made glide bombs to Taiwan have experienced delays.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • The delays in US arms shipments will very likely motivate Taiwan to increase unilateral domestic defense production. Taiwan will very unlikely receive sensitive technology from US defense contractors for domestic production due to monetary and national security concerns. In place of technology transfers with the US, Taiwan will very likely increase investment in national manufacturing and R&D centers, such as the NCSIST, likely aiming to domestically develop aircraft and missile systems, like the Barracuda 500, to complement US weaponry in the long term. Enhanced Taiwanese self-sufficient defense will likely decrease its reliance on US military assistance, very likely improving its resilience to a potential Chinese blockade of the island without impediments due to foreign arms suppliers.

  • The delay in F-16V delivery will unlikely speed up China’s military plans regarding potential confrontation with Taiwan in the next months. The weaponry currently available to Taiwan and armaments scheduled for 2026, such as Lockheed Martin High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), will likely deter China from seeking direct confrontation to avoid retaliation. China will likely use the next months to expand its arsenal and update its training drill scenarios to match Taiwan’s specific capabilities, such as countering a Taiwanese HIMAR strike on China’s Fujian province. China will likely engage in business espionage tactics to monitor the progress of Taiwan’s military suppliers, likely using this information to enhance its military plans.

[1] Soldier in the Nigerian Army posts as a lookout during a drill as part of FLINTLOCK 20, by Petty Officer 2nd Class Sean Castellano, licensed under Public Domain (he appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD/DoW endorsement.)

[2] Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM says it killed soldier in first Nigeria attack, Reuters, October 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-qaeda-linked-jnim-says-it-killed-soldier-first-nigeria-attack-2025-10-31/ 

[3] US working overtime to speed up delayed F-16 deliveries, Taiwan says, Reuters, November 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-working-overtime-speed-up-delayed-f-16-deliveries-taiwan-says-2025-11-03/  

bottom of page