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REPORTEDLY, RUSSIA PLANNED TO INCREASE ITS UNMANNED SYSTEMS FORCES BY 2026, AND ITALY AND GERMANY LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE TRANSALPINE OIL PIPELINE DISRUPTION AS POSSIBLE SABOTAGE

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April 9-15, 2026 | Issue 15 - EUCOM Team

Nicola Bonsegna, Jaydn Burgin, Sofía Vilas, Fleur Van Gorp

Alexia Andrica, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

Drone[1]


Date: April 9, 2026

Location: Russia

Parties involved: Russia; Unmanned Systems Forces (USF); Russian troops; personnel; Ukraine; Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi; Western allies  

The event: According to Syrskyi, Russia plans to expand its USF to approximately 165,500 personnel by the end of 2026.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

  • The expansion of the USF will very likely enhance Russia’s capacity to conduct sustained drone operations against critical infrastructure, likely heightening the need for strengthened protective measures around critical energy sites. More frequent and coordinated long-range drone strike operations will very likely overextend Ukrainian air defenses, likely increasing successful strikes against energy infrastructure beyond the frontline. Repeated drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure will likely reduce grid stability by forcing recurring repairs and causing localized power disruptions that hinder civilian services, likely driving demand for infrastructure repair and protection efforts. Continued Russian pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure will very likely require closer coordination between Ukraine and Western allies to sustain financial support programs for infrastructure protection and repair, including stronger defenses around critical energy facilities and continued reconstruction of damaged sites. 

  • Russia’s planned USF enlargement will very likely heighten its demand for short-range UAVs, likely exposing predictable and visible logistical targets to Ukrainian strikes. The expansion will likely intensify Russian troops’ dependence on uninterrupted and high-volume resupply of short-range, first-person view (FPV) drones and require additional logistical effort. Higher volumes of drone-related equipment transported to the frontline will very likely amplify reliance on highly visible infrastructure, such as highways and bridges, to bypass non-transitable routes, likely exposing Russian supply lines to predictable chokepoints. This dynamic will likely mark key Russian military assets and essential transport infrastructure as targets for Ukrainian strikes before they reach the frontline, disrupting its short-range drone supply and leaving Russian positions underequipped.


Date: April 11, 2026

Location: Italy

Parties involved: Italy; Trieste public prosecutor’s office; Italian national gendarmerie Carabinieri; German intelligence services; EU; EU member states; EU members; intelligence agencies; saboteurs; threat actors; attackers; perpetrators

The event: Trieste’s public prosecutor’s office, the Carabinieri, and German intelligence services launched a joint investigation into the March Transalpine Oil Pipeline (TAL) disruption as a possible sabotage act.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • The launch of the investigation into the TAL pipeline disruption will likely incentivize threat actors to adopt low-profile and unsophisticated attack methods that will very likely enhance plausible deniability and complicate attribution. Ongoing investigations will likely cause attackers to prioritize remote, minimally monitored infrastructure targets, with a roughly even chance that limited oversight will constrain evidence collection. Simple attacks will very likely occur more frequently than sophisticated operations, likely straining investigative efforts by generating recurring, similar incidents that obscure whether disruptions are isolated or part of coordinated, hybrid warfare activity. The covert nature of tactics will likely complicate attribution by creating ambiguity between natural causes, accidents, and deliberate sabotage, very likely limiting intelligence agencies’ ability to establish responsibility and prosecute perpetrators.

  • The possibility of saboteurs having attacked TAL-linked infrastructure will likely foster prolonged international coordination among EU member states to implement safeguarding measures.  EU member states will very likely interpret a potential sabotage as an indication of vulnerabilities in the physical exposure of electricity infrastructure and its interdependence with cross-border energy systems, likely upholding incident responses based on EU instruments, such as the CER Directive and Regulation (EU) 2019/941. EU members will likely improve information sharing through consultation between national critical infrastructure competent authorities and cross-border contingency planning through developing risk preparedness plans based on regional risk scenarios and consultation with neighbouring EU members. Differing national priorities will unlikely prompt a fully unified EU response, with cooperation likely concentrating primarily among the directly affected countries, and member states that consider shared critical infrastructure interdependencies vulnerable.

[1] Drone, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)

[3] Sabotage on the Terna power line in Friuli has repercussions on an oil pipeline, Ansa, April 2026,

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