top of page

THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SHUT DOWN INTERNET AND TELEPHONE SERVICES DURING PROTESTS, AND RUSSIA TARGETED ENERGY GRID IN UKRAINE

January 8-14, 2026 | Issue 2 - Emergency Management, Health, and Hazards (EMH2) Team

Ludovica Leccese, Giovanni Lamberti, Lavinia Ansalone, Halleli Alpert, Cora Jordan

Elizabeth Fignar, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

 

Infrastructure Shut Down[1]


Date: January 8, 2026

Location: Iran

Parties involved: Iran; Iranian government; protesters; Iranian diaspora;  US; Israel; regional and international adversaries; anti-Western and anti-Israeli audience; non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

The event: The Iranian government shut down internet access and telephone services during the protests.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Iran’s regional and international adversaries, such as the US and Israel, will very likely interpret the shutdown period as an opportunity to apply calibrated pressure against Iran. Broad infrastructure restrictions will likely signal that Iran has prioritized internal security enforcement and crisis management, likely diverting technical and intelligence resources away from external monitoring, attribution, and early warning.  Regional and international adversaries will likely favor incremental and deniable measures by leveraging nationwide unrest rather than direct military confrontation, likely through gray-zone operations designed to exploit ambiguity and constrain escalation, such as covert information tactics amplifying protest narratives and grievances. These conditions will likely increase Iran’s exposure to cyber intrusions and physical sabotage, as degraded external vigilance and attribution capacity likely lower timely detection and response.

  • Prolonged infrastructure disruption will very likely enhance the Iranian government’s leverage over the external narrative, likely enabling it to selectively spread events that reinforce its framing while downplaying the more delegitimizing ones. Iranian disinformation campaigns will almost certainly continue to selectively acknowledge some economic grievances that increased popular discontent, while simultaneously delegitimizing and securitizing protesters, labeling them as terrorists and foreign destabilizers to resonate with the anti-Western and anti-Israeli audience. The Iranian government will very likely minimize the scale and human impact of the unrest, portraying protesters as violent, likely using official and some NGOs' estimates, and partially acknowledging developments to avoid losing complete international credibility. The Iranian government will very likely downplay the repressive means adopted and undermine the effectiveness of Iranian diaspora-based amplification through the selective use of decontextualized videos and images and AI strategies such as deepfakes.


Date: January 11, 2026

Location: Ukraine

Parties involved: Russia; Ukraine; energy sector; emergency services; civilians; partners

The event: Russia struck a high-voltage power grid in Ukraine, leading to temporary disruptions.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Russia’s attrition strategy targeting energy infrastructure will unlikely be effective in the long term, as Ukrainian adaptation will likely limit its impact. Through increased partners' support, Ukraine will very likely enhance its anti-aerial warfare through short and medium-range missiles, likely causing an effective reduction in Russia’s power grid targets, particularly during lower seasonal vulnerability. Russia’s provision of the Oreshnik missile will very likely drive Ukraine to decentralize energy grids, likely through distributed backup generators, improving its infrastructure resilience. Russian attacks will almost certainly target already damaged and reconstructed interconnectors, such as those in Odesa or Lviv, to maintain proximity to the Black Sea, very likely prompting Ukraine to accelerate its fuel stockpile and battery storage projects.

  • Russia will very likely coordinate airstrikes against Ukraine’s power grids with seasonal vulnerabilities to hinder recovery capabilities. Airstrikes coinciding with freezing temperatures will likely degrade operating capacity over time by depleting emergency services and overextending energy facilities, likely reducing holistic system resilience and prolonging power outages and power grid repairs. To circumvent this, Ukraine will likely divert fuel from military defenses to stabilize the energy sector and emergency services. Russia will likely time future airstrikes based on compounding weather-related setbacks, such as Ukraine’s failure to respond to humanitarian and infrastructure impact and resources reallocation, very likely posing a greater threat to civilians.

[1] Shut down internet access, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)

[2] Internet and phones cut in Iran as protesters heed exiled prince’s call for mass demonstration, AP, January 2026, https://apnews.com/article/iran-protests-us-israel-war-nuclear-economy-ebddd998fbe7903e70ca62127250ebcb 

[3] Zaporizhzhia Oblast loses power for 2nd time this week as Ukraine faces 'most difficult situation with electricity this winter', Kyiv Independent, January 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/zaporizhzhia-oblast-loses-power-overnight-for-second-time-in-a-week/ 

bottom of page