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TURKEY UNVEILS A WEAPONS SYSTEM THAT CONVERTS CARGO CONTAINERS INTO CONCEALED LONG-RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, ADF KILLS 43 CIVILIANS AT A CHURCH  

Updated: 2 days ago

July 24-30, 2025 | Issue 28 - Weapons and Tactics Team

Amelia Bell, Sue Friend, Isabelle Hilyer-Jones, Lucy Gibson, Agathe Labadi

Sakura Morales Furuta, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

 

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Cargo Containers at Sea[1]

Date: July 24, 2025

Location: Turkey

Parties involved: Turkey; Thailand; Cambodia; adversarial states; NATO; military leadership; military legal advisors; operational commanders; customs authorities and officials; port authorities and officials; shipping companies; logistics providers

The event: Turkey unveiled a weapons system that converts standard cargo containers into concealed long-range Kara Atmaca missile launchers, allowing for stealth precision attacks.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Countries recently engaging in conflict, such as Thailand and Cambodia, will likely be interested in acquiring Turkey’s new concealed weapons system, likely aiming to diversify their arsenal and devise sophisticated covert operations. Thailand and Cambodia will very likely seek to expand their covert weaponry arsenal to overcome surveillance and intelligence-gathering issues linked to their proximity, which very likely hampers militaristic advancements. The acquisition of stealth missile launchers would very likely contribute to enhanced combat proficiency between Thailand and Cambodia, very likely enabling covert encroachment or surveillance operations to go unnoticed. There is a roughly even chance that this weaponry will increase distrust between Cambodia and Thailand, likely forcing both to strike a balance between acquiring stealth technology and fostering peaceful coexistence.

  • Port authorities and customs authorities worldwide will very likely impose tighter restrictions on cargo arriving from adversarial states, fearing the presence of concealed containerized missile launchers. This regulatory tightening will very likely complicate port operations by increasing scrutiny on cargo, causing longer security checks, import delays, and bottlenecks that disrupt commercial flows. Customs and port officials will very likely face challenges in verifying cargo authenticity and maintaining transparency while minimizing disruption to trade efficiency. Private sector actors such as shipping companies and logistics providers will very likely intensify cooperation with customs and port authorities to streamline cargo screening protocols, such as enhanced pre-clearance procedures and standardized cargo tracking, to balance security imperatives with supply chain resilience.

  • Military legal advisors and operational commanders will very likely face complex challenges as containerized missile launchers disguised as civilian cargo blur the distinction between civilian and military targets. This ambiguity will very likely complicate decisions around target identification and lawful engagement under established rules of engagement (ROE), increasing risks of misidentification and potential escalation. Military leadership will likely reassess engagement protocols in maritime and littoral conflict zones to account for evolving dual-use threats. Multilateral bodies, such as NATO, will likely review the doctrines governing military transparency and adherence to the principle of distinction under international humanitarian law to reduce legal liabilities and clarify operational guidance in maritime conflict zones.


Date: July 27, 2025

Location: Komanda, Irumu Territory, Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of Congo

Parties involved: Democratic Republic of Congo;  Congolese government; Congolese authorities; Congolese army Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC); Congolese Rwandan-backed paramilitary group March 23 Movement (M23); association of Lendu militia group Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO); Congolese paramilitary group Front Populaire D’autodéfense en Ituri (Zaire-FPAC); Catholic church attendees; Congolese civilians; Uganda; extremist groups; IS-backed Ugandan extremist group the Allied Democratic Force (ADF); Ugandan and Congolese anti-ADF joint armed forces; China

The event: ADF attacked attendees of a night vigil at a Catholic church, killing 43 civilians.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • M23 will very likely exploit the attack’s high civilian death toll to criticize the Congolese government for its inability to protect civilians, likely using it as a bargaining chip to gain advantageous concessions during ongoing peace talks. M23 will very likely emphasize the FARDC’s indefensibility in Komanda as symptomatic of a wider governmental incompetence, likely citing the porous border between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as evidence of the Congolese authorities’ inability to prevent extremist activities. Through this rhetoric, M23 will likely push for more favorable peace deals, hinged on increased M23 control of areas with a high presence of extremist groups like Komanda and wider Ituri under the guise of protecting civilians. By complicating negotiation talks, there is a roughly even chance that this attack will enable M23 to establish itself as an implicit authority in the eastern border provinces like Ituri, North Kivu, or South Kivu, likely enabling them to request better access to resources and territory during peace talks.

  • Joint Ugandan and Congolese armed forces’ anti-ADF campaigns will unlikely stop ADF from continuing its attacks, likely exposing weaknesses in the current anti-ADF strategies, such as vulnerability to foreign interference. Anti-ADF forces will very likely lack the numbers and resources to monitor the eastern provinces and the multiple paramilitary groups, such as ADF, CODECO, and Zaire-FPAC, likely resulting in slower response time and emboldening rebel activity. An inability to counter threats and the resulting risk to civilian lives, as demonstrated by this attack, will likely encourage anti-ADF leadership to outsource to third-party nations such as China for support. China will likely exploit the lack of anti-ADF operational cohesion and indefensibility to establish itself as a proxy regional power by supplying loan-based weaponry and aid under unfavorable conditions to the involved countries.

[1] Containers, generated by a third party database

[2] Turkey turns cargo containers into surprise missile launchers for stealth attacks, Interesting Engineering, July 2025, https://interestingengineering.com/military/shipping-containers-into-surprise-missile-launchers 

[3] Carnage en Ituri: une attaque des ADF fait 43 morts et d’importants dégâts à Komanda, Radio Okapi, July 2025, https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/27/actualite/securite/carnage-en-ituri-une-attaque-des-adf-fait-43-morts-et-dimportants (translated by Google)

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