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IN SOUTH SUDAN, THE PRESIDENT SUSPENDS VP MACHAR FOLLOWING CHARGES OF TREASON AND MURDER AGAINST THE VP, AND IN NIGERIA, ARMED BANDITS STORM AND KIDNAP 40 WORSHIPPERS IN A MOSQUE

September 11-17, 2025 | Issue 35 - CENTCOM/AFRICOM Team

Farah Birch, Cora Jordan, Benjamin Baruch, Isabelle Hilyer-Jones, Giovanni Lamberti, Meaghan Mackey, Amelia Bell, Ludovica Leccese

Kate Shymkiv, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

 

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South Sudan[1]


Date: September 11, 2025

Location: South Sudan

Parties involved: President of South Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit; South Sudan; Vice President (VP) of South Sudan Riek Machar; South Sudanese government; South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF); federal forces; Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO); South Sudanese political groups; South Sudanese ethnic militias; South Sudanese armed groups and factions; ethnic Nuer militant organization White Army; Nuer communities; Nuer refugees; non-combative communities; South Sudanese civil society organizations; South Sudanese Civil Society Organization Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO); South Sudanese civilians and citizens; internally displaced persons (IDPs); UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); UNMISS personnel; neighboring states; international actors distributing humanitarian aid in South Sudan

The event: Mayardit suspended Machar after the VP received charges for treason and murder for his alleged participation in ethnic militia attacks against federal forces.[2] 

Analysis & Implications:

  • The instability will likely cause neighboring states to harden their borders and limit refugees due to fears of conflict spillover, significantly increasing the IDPs near the South Sudanese borders. IDPs will very likely be forced to live in improvised camps with inadequate protection or care, challenging the humanitarian aid distribution. International actors involved in aid distribution, such as UNMISS, will very likely have to reallocate resources and personnel to protect and provide humanitarian assistance to these disparate camps, very likely thinning their forces and resources. This will very likely reduce UNMISS's capacity to provide adequate humanitarian assistance and development initiatives to South Sudanese civilians, likely exacerbating food insecurity and the spread of cholera

  • The South Sudanese civil society organizations, like CEPO, will very likely view the VP’s suspension as an instrumentalization of power that serves the government’s interests in maintaining its authority amid a power struggle. The civil society will very likely regard ministerial instability as undermining the electoral preparations, almost certainly leading to a decline in trust between the government and its citizens. Civil society will very likely question the democratic legitimacy of elections, leading to lower voter turnout and reduced government support, which will likely increase the possibility of delayed elections and strained relationships.

  • Machar’s suspension will almost certainly deepen ethnic polarization and fragment both political and armed groups, very likely increasing inter-factional clashes and factional divisions. Nuer communities will very likely increase their reliance on communitarian militias like the White Army, prompting it to defend the territory and retaliate against SSPDF presence, enhancing mobilization and violent attacks around Nasir. The Nuer community’s reliance on militias will very likely deepen clashes between rival militias and armed factions, likely driving the spread of violence beyond Nasir into the neighboring regions. There is a roughly even chance that intensified clashes will increase ethnic polarization and factional splits within the SSPDF and SPLM-IO, likely reinforcing perceptions amongst non-combative communities that armed resistance is the only viable response to escalating militia attacks.

Date: September 15, 2025

Location: Gidan Turbe Village, Tsafe Local Government Area, Zamfara State, Nigeria

Parties involved: Nigeria; Nigerian government; Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF); bandits operating in Zamfara State; counter-bandit vigilante groups and for-hire militias; kidnapped worshipers; Nigerian civilians in Zamfara and Kaduna States; Salafi jihadist group the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP); regional jihadist groups; jihadist group affiliated with al-Qaeda the Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa (Ansaru)

The event: Armed bandits stormed a mosque, kidnapping 40 worshippers.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Continued abductions will very likely drive a self-perpetuating insecurity dynamic, likely undermining government legitimacy by showcasing the authorities’ inability to protect civilians from bandit attacks. These dynamics will likely push civilians to rely on vigilante groups for defense, likely increasing the demand for informal counter-bandit militias within Zamfara State. For-hire and vigilante militia activity will likely provoke retaliatory attacks from bandits vying to maintain informal control and free movement in the area, likely escalating violence and endangering civilians being kidnapped as a bargaining chip. Increased instability and newly established, non-governmental counter-bandit militias will likely reinforce perceptions of state weakness, likely perpetuating regional insecurity by legitimizing informal militias.

  • The Nigerian government will very likely increase military presence in Zamfara State to tackle bandits, likely forcing them to escape, putting civilians at risk of kidnapping and bandit confrontations. Increased NAF activity in northern areas of Zamfara will very likely push bandits south toward more populated areas such as Kaduna North Local Government Area, likely endangering more civilians as armed bandits seek to obtain escape vehicles and communication devices. Looting and mobile phone thefts will very likely escalate as bandits attempt to evade NAF troops during their escapes, very likely increasing violent confrontations between bandits and civilians. Fleeing Zamfara bandits will very likely resort to kidnappings-for-ransom in southern territories to financially sustain themselves outside of established northern bases, likely spreading bandit-driven instability and violence into urban areas.

  • Abductions and strategic operations by local northwestern bandit groups will almost certainly increase in size and scale, as these groups will likely expand alliances with regional jihadist groups such as ISWAP and Ansaru. Jihadist groups will very likely provide bandits with advanced weaponry and operational training, likely requesting increased ideological convergence and security guarantees to transit into the northwestern region of Nigeria to conduct illicit trade operations. The acquisition through jihadist groups of advanced weapons such as sophisticated suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) and military grade assault rifles will very likely allow local bandits to expand operations targeting civilians and regional mining activities, likely attempting to secure economic gains and exploit security gaps in the region. There is a roughly even chance that bandits and jihadist groups will conduct joint operations against NAF, likely signaling an emboldening of local bandits to escalate from kidnapping worshippers to targeting regional Nigerian military bases and main roads.

[1] South Sudan by Google Maps

[2] South Sudan VP Machar charged with treason and murder, suspended by president, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-sudan-vp-machar-charged-with-treason-murder-suspended-by-president-2025-09-11/

[3] Bandits kidnap 40 worshippers during morning prayers in Zamfara, Daily Post Nigeria, September 2025, https://dailypost.ng/2025/09/15/bandits-kidnap-40-worshippers-during-morning-prayers-in-zamfara/ 

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