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LUKASHENKO RELEASES 52 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR PARTIAL US SANCTIONS RELIEF ON BELARUS AIRLINES, AND UKRAINE CONSIDERS RESTRICTIONS ON MOBILE SERVICES TO DISRUPT RUSSIAN DRONE ATTACKS

September 11-17, 2025 | Issue 35 - EUCOM Team

Martina Lopez Hernandez, Chiara Michieli, Camilla Raffaelli, Indira Hankins, Jacob Fields, Marija Lazic, Cristino Calvo, Jose Antonio Heras Luna

Katrina Bustillos, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

 

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Barbed Wire Surrounding a Prison[1]

Date: September 12, 2025

Location: Minsk, Belarus

Parties involved: Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko; Belarus; Belarusian national airline Belavia; political prisoners in Belarus; journalists in Belarus; Belarusian population; USA; EU; EU diplomats; Russia President Vladimir Putin; Russia; Ukraine; Western countries

The event: Lukashenko released 52 political prisoners in exchange for the US partially lifting sanctions on the Belavia airline.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

  • The release of the 52 political prisoners in Belarus will almost certainly be a superficial gesture rather than a considerable governmental move toward freedom of speech, as Lukashenko very likely aims to retain control over political dissent without raising the potential for opposing views. The regime will very likely force the political prisoners to remain in exile in foreign countries, likely limiting the influence they exert on Belarusian domestic politics. Lukashenko will very likely continue limiting civil liberties in Belarus, likely using the prisoners' release as a tool to relieve international economic and diplomatic pressure while ensuring that dissenting voices are outside the reach of the domestic population.

  • Belarus will very likely continue pursuing dialogue with Western countries to negotiate the lifting of sanctions, likely exploiting the Western focus on civil liberties as a bargaining chip. Lukashenko will likely aim to instrumentally showcase his openness to forming multilateral relationships with Western countries and present himself as a cooperative partner, with a roughly even chance that he will independently order the release of political prisoners as a goodwill gesture. Lukashenko's diplomats negotiating with the EU will likely frame the release of journalists and political opponents as proof that Belarus is willing to address European human rights concerns, prompting EU diplomats to follow the US example.

  • There is almost no chance that this agreement will significantly alter Belarus’s cooperation with Russia, with Minsk very likely aiming to leverage its resources in alignment with Russia’s wartime needs to improve its relative power. Belarus will very likely exploit the newly lifted sanctions to buy US-made aircraft parts under the pretense of repairing its Belavia fleet, likely aiming to divert spare aviation components to support Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine. Minsk will very likely attempt to increase its strategic autonomy in the face of the substantial economic dependence on Moscow, likely aiming to become Russia’s main supplier of aviation components. Minsk's role in the wartime supply chain will likely enhance Lukashenko's position vis-à-vis Putin, with a roughly even chance that Minsk will seek to break the historical dynamics of junior partner and improve its bargaining power in bilateral relations.    


Date: September 14, 2025

Location: Kyiv, Ukraine

Parties involved: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky; Ukraine; Ukrainian government; Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU); Ukrainian emergency services; Ukrainian emergency response teams; Ukrainian civilians in frontline and urban areas; Russia

The event: Ukraine considers restrictions on high-speed mobile phone services to disrupt Russian drones.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Restraining mobile service will very likely challenge Ukraine’s emergency response teams' capacities. Increased restraints will likely disrupt dispatch communications, geolocation systems, and coordinated community emergency responses, likely increasing the risk of casualties in impacted zones. Emergency services that rely on 4G/5G for dispatch, coordination, and real-time situational awareness will almost certainly experience delays in reaching affected civilians, reducing the effectiveness of life-saving interventions. Constrained emergency responses and increased casualties will likely prompt civilian distrust in the first responders/emergency services' ability to provide timely support during attacks, likely reducing compliance with official guidance and making them vulnerable to misinformation.

  • Targeted mobile network restrictions will likely reduce the effectiveness of Russian drones by denying their access to real-time video transmission, but only in the short term. Network restrictions’ immediate impact will almost certainly damage specific Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Over time, their effectiveness will very likely diminish, as Ukraine very likely lacks extensive operational knowledge and historical precedents to better develop them. There is a roughly even chance that disservice to civilians will outweigh battlefield gains, likely forcing AFU to decrease its reliance on such measures.

[1] Bird Mitigation Operations on JBSA-Randolph by Jonathan Mallard, licensed under Public Domain (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD/DoW endorsement.)

[2] Belarus frees 52 political prisoners as US lifts some sanctions on its national airline, AP, September 2025, https://apnews.com/article/belarus-prisoners-us-lithuania-c217e9bb36b9303e0fa2acd8e0492b37 

[3] Ukraine considers limiting mobile service to counter Russian drones, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-considers-limiting-mobile-service-counter-russian-drones-2025-09-14/

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